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STUDENT COMMENTS
The following comments were written by students at Northwestern University School of Law.
Contributors to the present issue are John L. Ropiequet, George I. Gdlman, Paul H. Duvall and John
P. Owen.
PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:
A COMMON LAW APPROACH
Pretrial detention under the District of Colum-
bia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970' marks an important break with 181 years of
federal bail policy, which has remained virtually
unchanged since the Judiciary Act of 1789.2 Much
has been writtens on the constitutionality of this
part of the controversial act because it appears to
reverse the movement towards bail reform which
resulted in the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966.4
Since the pretrial detention law affords judges5 in
the District of Columbia a procedure by which
they may deny bail entirely to some defendants be-
fore they come to trial, the law has evoked strong
objections.6
Despite this criticism, there has been no careful
analysis of how the eighth amendment excessive
I PuB. L. 91-358. Pretrial detention law to be codified
As D.C. CoDE, ENcYcL. ANN. §§ 23-1321-32 [here-
inafter cited as D.C. CoDu].
2Compare the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33,
1 Stat. 91, with FED. R. CGwu. P. 46 (Rule 46 is the
successor to § 33 of the Act).
3 See Allington, Preventive Detention of the Accused
before Trial, 19 U. K"i. L. Rxv. 109 (1970); Borman,
The Selling of Preventive Detention 1970, 65 Nw. U. L.
RFv. 879 (1971); Hickey, Preventive Detention and the
Crime of Being Dangerous, 58 GEO. L. Rzv. 287 (1969);
Hruska, Preventive Detention: the Constitution and the
Congress, 3 CaxiGnToN L. Rxv. 36 (1969); Mitchell,
'Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Bail Reform,
55 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1969); Portman, "To Detain or
Not to Detain"-A Review of the Background, Current
Proposals, and Debate on Preventive Detention, 10 SA=TA
CLARA LAw. 224 (1970); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention:
Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA.
L. REv. 371 (1970); Comment, Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YAME L.3. 941 (1970); Comment, The Costs of Preventive Deten-
tion, 79 YAr L. J. 926 (1970); Comment, Preventive
Detention and the Proposed Amendments to the Bail
Reform Act of 1966, 11 Wmr. & MARY L. REV. 525(1969).
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-52 (Supp. II, 1966).
'The term "judges," as used in this comment, in-
chudes also United States Commissioners, magistrates,
and all others who are qualified under applicable state
or federal law to set bail.
6 See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 3; Portman, supra
note 3.
bail clause applies to pretrial detention.7 This
clause states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired." It is the only part of the Constitution
which governs the granting or denying of bail.
Since pretrial detention is the refusal to set bail
for the accused, it is essential to determine the
meaning of the excessive bail clause in order to test
the constitutionality of the new pretrial detention
law.
This comment will examine the meaning of the
excessive bail clause in terms of the common law.
Since the Supreme Court has never satisfactorily
interpreted the clause, its interpretation requires a
determination of its common law meaning. The
common law limitations on denial of bail found in
the excessive bail clause, as they existed when the
clause was ratified, will be set forth. This comment
will then demonstrate how the common law sur-
rounding bail, as it presently exists under the
eighth amendment, permits pretrial detention. The
objections to the procedural aspects of pretrial
detention will be considered and answered, and the
limited applicability of pretrial detention will be
noted.
THE BACxGROUND Or PRETRiAL DETENTION: THE
BAIL RFxoss AcT or 1966
Pretrial detention of dangerous offenders was
presented to Congress in 1969 as part of President
Nixon's "war on crime," to fulfill campaign prom-
ises to halt the ever-rising crime rate.' Senate Bill
26009 was introduced as an amendment to the Bail
7 See, e.g., Allington, supra note 3, at 111-12; Bor-
man, supra note 3, at 901-03, 914-15.
' See statement of Sen. Hruska, a co-sponsor of S.
2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), on its introduction to
the Senate, 115 CONG. Rlc. S7906 (daily ed. July 11,
1969). S. 2600 was made a part of S. 2601, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970).
' 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The text of the pro-
posed bill may be found at 115 CONG. lro. S7908-09
(daily ed. July 11, 1969).
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Reform Act of 1966, as applied to the District of
Columbia, to allow
for legislative authorization to consider danger to
the community in setting nonfinancial pretrial
release conditions, to detain certain defendants
found to be dangerous, to revoke the release of
those defendants who violate release conditions and
to punish those who commit crimes while released
on bail with added penalties.10
The Bail Reform Act itself had established a policy
of pretrial release for as many defendants as pos-
sible on personal recognizance or on an unsecured
personal appearance bond." Money bail was to be
the judge's last resort as a condition which would
assure appearance at trial. The act was meant to
end the abuses of the money bail system, especially
the unequal treatment of rich and poor and the
high social cost of keeping thousands of people in
jail before trial for long periods of time without
just cause.0 2
'Id. at S7909 (letter of Atty. Gen. Mitchell to the
President of the Senate).
"Beyond release on personal recognizance or unse-
cured appearance bond, conditions available, in order
of stringency, are: 1) supervisory custody, 2) restric-
tions on travel, association, or abode, 3) appearance
bond with up to 10% refundable cash deposit with the
court, 4) secured bail bond or deposit of cash with the
court for the face amount, 5) any other condition rea-
sonably necessary, including nighttime confinement.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3146 (a) (1)-(5) (Supp. II, 1966).
12 The purpose of the Bail Reform Act was
to assure that all persons, regardless of their finan-
cial status, shall not needlessly be detained pend-
ing their appearance to answer charges, to testify,
or pending appeal, when detention serves neither
the ends of justice nor the public interest.
H.R. REP. No. 1541,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966). See
S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965).
The studies of the bail system which prompted the
act emphasized the fact that nearly all defendants will
come to trial whether released on bond, or on personal
recognizance.
Early studies pointed out the wastefulness of detain-
ing defendants unable to post bond, since a large num-
ber of them were eventually nol-prossed, got suspended
sentences, or minor sentences in the county jail. See,
e.g., Morse & Beattie, Survey of the Administration of
Criminal Justice in Oregon, 11 ORE. L. Rxv. 1 (supp.
1932), where the percentages in these categories were
found to be 54.2%, 13.6%, and 24.1% respectively,
leaving only 8.1% of all felony cases studied to be sen-
tenced to the state penitentiary. Id. at 220. Later
studies found large numbers of defendants unable to
post relatively low bail bonds. See Foote, et al., Com-
pelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in
Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. Rav. 1031 (1954); Roberts,
et al., A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York
City, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1958). In New York City,
for example, 18% of those who had bail set at $500
could not post bail, 28% could not post bail at $1,000,
and 45% could not post bail at $1,500. Roberts, supra,
at 707; similar results in Foote, supra, at 1032-33.
With some misgivings," the federal district,
courts implemented this policy, often goaded by,
the circuit courts. 4 However, any benefits from,
the reform were quickly overshadowed by the
sharply rising crime rates across the country, most
noticeably, from the viewpoint of Congress at
least, in the District of Columbia. Reports of con-
tinued criminal conduct by those released on bail!
created pressure for some sort of measure to confine,
dangerous defendants before trial, 5 since this could
no longer be accomplished sub rosa by setting-
exorbitant bail. The pretrial detention law met
The Manhattan Bail Project resulted from these
studies in 1961. Funded by a private philanthropist, the
project set up a bail agency which was to interview de-
fendants after they were charged, in order to recom-
mend the release of good bail risks to the court on per-
sonal recognizance only. Ares, et al., The Manhattan
Bail Project: an Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Triol
Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 67, 71-72 (1963). In contrast
to the normal forfeiture rate of 3% of those released on
bail, the Manhattan Bail Project releasees showed only
a 1.6% rate of forfeiture. PRoE INGs or Tim NA-
TIONAL CONFERENcE ON BAIL AND CR iNAL JUsTIcE,
Interim Report xxil-miii (1965). These results prompted
experiments by the federal government and a number
of states. Id. at xx-xxi; PRocEEDINGs or TE INSTTUTE
ON THE OPERATION or PRETRIAL RELEASE PnogEcTs 9,
(1966). A 3% overall forfeiture rate was achieved in a
similar project in the District of Columbia. R.
MOrLEUR, ET AL., BAIL R OIu IN THE NATION'S
CAPITAL 31 (1966). The results also contributed to the
writing of the Bail Reform Act. Hearings on H.R. 3576,
H.R. 3577, H.R. 3578, H.R. 5923, H.R. 6271, H.R. 6934,
H.R. 10195 and S. 1357 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13,
at 21-34, 41 (1966) (statements of Atty. Gen. Clark
and James V. Bennett of the A.B.A.).
13nie States v. Melville, 306 F. Supp. 124
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). judge Frankel complained that he
had no choice but to reduce bail for five defendants ac-
cused of several skyscraper bombings. The U.S. Com-
missioner set bail at $100,000 to $300,000, which was
reduced to $20,000 to $50,000. For the aftermath of
this decision, see United States v. Melville, 309 F,
Supp. 822; 309 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); People v.
Melville, 62 Misc.2d 366, 308 N.Y.S.2d 671 (N.Y.C.
Crim. Ct. 1970).
14 Courts setting money bail, instead of releasing on
personal recognizance, were reversed in United States
v. Bronson, 433 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United
States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Wood v. United States, 391 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
see Allen v. United States, 386 F.2d 634, 637 (1967)
(dissenting opinion). But see id. at 634 (majority opin-
ion) (There is no right to release on recognizance).
1" Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1236-37. While Sen.
Hruska admitted that Atty. Gen. Mitchell's figures on
the recidivism rate of those out on bail, up to 82% in
one study he cited, may be overblown, any substantial
rate is "cause for public and official concern." 115
CONG. REc. 87907 (daily ed. July 11, 1969). A more be-
lievable figure is about 10%. Hickey, supra note 3, at
302-03; Portman, supra note 3, at 236. In his own arti-
cle, however, the only figure Sen. HEruska cited was the
82% rate. Hruska, supra note 3, at 61.
19711
COMMENT
this demand by allowing a judge to order detention
without bail in carefully limited circumstances and
under well-defined procedures.8
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRETRIAL DETENTION:
ExcEssivE BAIL
The Supreme Court has dealt with the excessive
bail clause infrequently, because the federal law
regarding bail has been well-settled since the
judiciary Act of 1789.17 Under the Act, everyone
charged with a noncapital offense must be granted
the right to release on bail. The federal courts have
uniformly upheld that right. 8 As a result, the
Court has dealt with the excessive bail clause in
only two cases, decided during the same term.
In Stack v. Boyle,19 very high bail was ordered
for several defendants charged under the Smith
Act based on the government's allegation that a
Communist conspiracy existed such that they
would flee the country upon command if set free
on bail. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for the
Court, held that to protect the absolute right to
bail before trial in noncapital cases and to preserve
the presumption of innocence, only clear evidence
could justify high bail. 0 The Court vacated the
district court's denial of applications for bail.
21
Then in Carlson v. Landonn2 the Court refused to
apply the protection of the excessive bail clause of
16There are a number of conditions which act as
procedural safeguards. The judge may order pretrial
detention only in cases of certain specified offenses.
D.C. CODE §§ 23-1322(a)(1)-(3). He may order it only
if "there is no condition or combination of conditions of
release which will reasonably assure the safety of any
other person or the community." § 23-1322(b)(2)(B).
The hearing must be held immediately upon the de-
fendant's being brought before the judge. § 23-1322
(c) (3). The defendant has a right to counsel. § 23-1322
(c) (4). His testimony may not be used at trial. § 23-1322
(c)(6). He has a right to immediate appeal of the de-
tention order, which must be promptly determined.
§ 23-1324(b). If detained, he must be held separately
from convicts "to the extent practicable." § 23-1321(h).
He shall be released from detention "for limited periods
of time to prepare defenses or for other proper reasons."
§ 23-1321(h) (2).
The text of the pretrial detention law may be found
in 7 BNA Canr. L. REPTR. 3295-97 (1970).
17 See note 2 supra.
18 Note, Preventive Detention before Trial, 79 HARv.
L. REv. 1489 (1966).
19 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
20 Id. at 4-6. Justice Jackson, concurring, noted that
Congress, in FED. R. CaR. P. 46, had assumed the risk
that some defendants will try to flee while out on bail,
in furthering a policy of keeping people out of jail until
being proven guilty. Id. at 8. He also condemned the
trial court's bowing to government pressure and public
opinion in setting such high bail. Id. at 10.
21Id. at 11.
2 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
the eighth amendment. This was a deportation
case involving several alien Communists,2 who
were held without bail by the Attorney General
pending their deportation hearings. The five-man
majority, per Justice Reed, held that Congress re-
tained the right to grant the Attorney General
power to refuse bail in such proceedings. The ma-
jority alluded to the excessive bail clause in the
English Bill of Rights of 1688 to show that Con-
gress retained the power to define "the classes of
cases in which bail shall be allowed." 24 That re-
mained the power over bail rights which Parliament
held at common law. The Court reasoned that this
power was incorporated into the United States
Constitution by the eighth amendment excessive
bail clause, since it was practically the same as the
English clause.'
5
In his dissent, Justice Black found that by the
majority's conception of the eighth amendment,
[that] Amendment's ban on excessive bail means
just about nothing.... Under this contention, the
Eighth Amendment is a limitation upon judges
only, for while a judge cannot constitutionally fix
excessive bail, Congress can direct that people be
held in jail without any right to bail at all .... The
Amendment is thus reduced below the level of a
pious admonition.2G
Justice Black contended that the excessive bail
clause, as a part of the American Bill of Rights of
1789, was intended to give more protection than
its counterpart in the English Bill of Rights of
1688.27
"3 Justice Black's description of the petitioners shows
them to be distinctly ordinary, non-violent people. Id.
at 549-51.
24 Id. at 545-46. The example cited was capital of-
fenses, where federal courts were given the discretion by
Congress to deny bail through the Judiciary Act of
1789. Id. at 545 n. 45. See 1 Stat. 91 (now FED. R.
CxRm. P. 46).
The majority's interpretation of the excessive bail
clause in the English Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., st. 2,
c. 1 (1688), is oversimplified at best. See note 32 infra
for Blackstone's summation of the effects of various acts
of Parliament from the Statute of Westminster I, 3
Edw. 1, c. 15 (1275) to the Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car.
2, c. 2 (1679). A more detailed development of the cate-
gories which are bailable and nonbailable can be found
in A. HIGHmoRa, A DIGEST oF =E DoczRINE or BAIL
147-67 (1791). Today, only treason cannot be bailed by
the trial judge, though judges of the High Court can
do so. Magistrates' Courts Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1
Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 8 (1952).
25 342 U.S. at 545-46. The only difference is that the
American clause is in mandatory language, while the
English clause is precatory.




Justice Burton, joining Justice Frankfurter's
dissenting opinion, suggested that the eighth
amendment necessarily implied a right to bail:
The Amendment cannot well mean that, on the one
hand, it prohibits the denial of bail so excessive in
amount as to be unattainable, yet, on the other
hand, under like circumstances, it does not pro-
hibit the denial of bail, which comes to the same
thing.2
Stack v. Boyle did not define the phrase "exces-
sive bail." Carlson v. Landon appeared to interpret
it but in a sharply divided 5-4 decision. Further-
more, a deportation hearing is not a criminal pro-
ceeding so Carlson did not deal with the right to
bailfpending a criminal trial. Rather, Carlson set
forth two contradictory lines of dicta. The ma-
jority held that Congress may set classes of offenses
where bail is not mandatory. This was what Con-
gress did in 1789 when it allowed judges to deny
bail in capital cases. The minority asserted that the
excessive bail clause would be but a "pious admoni-
tion" 29 if so interpreted, since Congress could
easily avoid the clause entirely by declaring
offenses nonbailable. Therefore, the only way to
make the clause an effective safeguard was to infer
from it an absolute right to bail.
The majority's view does not prevent the
danger which the minority foresaw. Yet the
minority's view does not comport with the literal
language of the clause. 'Excessive bail shall not be
required" deals on its face only with the amount of
bail set, if bail is set at all. Neither view rules
criminal procedure, thereby necessitating use of the
ordinary principles of constitutional construction
to examine the meaning of "excessive bail" at
common law.8' Such an examination will show that
2s Id. at 569.29 Id. at 556.
3D By these principles, the United States Constitution
must be interpreted according to the common law.
The interpretation of the constitution of the United
States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its
provisions are framed in the language of the Eng-
lish common law, and are to be read in the light of
its history. The code of constitutional and statu-
tory construction which, therefore, is gradually
formed by the judgments of this court ... has for
its basis so much of the common law as may be im-
plied in the subject, and constitutes a common law
resting on national authority.
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478-79 (1888). See
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, cert. denied,
305 U.S. 637, reh. denied, 305 U.S. 673 (1938), specifi-
cally excepts constitutional matters from the general
rule that there is no "federal general common law."
The English common law in its entirety was not incor-
bail may not be denied arbitrarily, but only for
good cause.
At common law, English judges exercised broad
discretion in granting or denying bail in various
classes of cases, subject to the requirement of the
English Bill of Rights that "excessive bail ought
not to be required." 3 According to Blackstone,
some offenses could not be bailed by the trial court;
others could be bailed at the trial court's discre-
tion; a third class of offenses had to be bailed in all
cases.32 These classes depended on the seriousness
of the offense and not on whether a capital offense
was involved.
In our federal system, this judicial discretion was
severely limited with the passage of the Judiciary
Act of 1789. Section 33 of the Act" gave defendants
an absolute privilege to claim pretrial bail in all
noncapital cases. In a capital case, federal judges
could grant or deny bail according to the circum-
stances of the matter and the normal practice of
the courts. Federal judges were and are apparently
willing to grant bail to capital offenders if the de-
fendant can establish good cause.2' The law has
porated into the Constitution, but was to be used by the
American courts as far as it was applicable. Van Ness v.
Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829); Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Patterson v. Winn,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 233 (1831).
311 W. & M., st. 2, c. 1 (1688).
2 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs ON T=E LAW
Or ENGLAND *298-300 (Jones ed. 1916). The first class
contains: 1) treason, 2) murder, 3) manslaughter, if the
guilt is clear, 4) prison-breaking, 5) outlawry, 6) ab-juring the realm, a self-banishing punishment, 7) ap-
provers, those who have confessed guilt and implicated
accomplices, 8) those taken in the act of felony, 9) arson,
and 10) excommunicants. The second class contains: 1)
known thieves, 2) all other felons, of bad character, and
3) accessories to felony, of bad character. The third
class contains: 1) manslaughter, if of good reputation,
2) felons, other than those above, and 3) accessories,
other than those above.
Today, English trial judges have discretion to grant
or deny bail in all cases except treason, where onlyjudges of the High Court can grant bail. Magistrates'
Courts Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, §§ 7(2), 8(1952). The judges were first given this power under the
Criminal Justice Administration Act, 7 Geo. 4, c. 64,§ 34 (1826), which repealed all the old statutes collected
by Blackstone. See 1 J. STEPnEN, A HISTORY or THE
CinnN.A LAw OF ENGLAND 238-39 (1883).
23 1 Stat. 91.
34See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 26 F.Cas. 658
(No. 15,495) (C.C.D. Pa. 1813), where Justice Bushrod
Washington admitted bail for a person charged with
piracy and suffering from possible pneumonia: "The
humanity of laws, not less than the feelings of the court,
favour the liberation of the prisoner upon bail, under
such circumstances." See United States v. Burr, 25
F.Cas. 55, 62 (No. 14,693) (C.C.D. Va. 1807), where
Chief Justice Marshall refused to deny Aaron Burr ad-
mission to bail despite a charge of treason. Lack of a
specific arrest for treason and lack of a hearing on the
1971]
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been made certain by the strict limitation on
judicial discretion with regard to pretrial bail.
Therefore, few federal cases have ever been decided
on this issue."
There are several cases on the common law con-
cerning bail under state law, however. These cases
elucidate the common law as it exists under a con-
stitutional excessive bail clause. Yet the cases
arise only in a few states since most jurisdictions
have an additional constitutional provision which
guarantees a right to bail in noncapital cases. The
states can be separated into two groups: 1) those
which guarantee bail in all but capital cases and
2) states which only guarantee against the imposi-
tion of excessive bail." The bail provisions in the
evidence sustaining the charge were listed by Marshall
as the reasons for refusing to deny bail. See also United
States ex rel. Covington v. Caparo, 297 F. Supp. 203
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Wansley v. Wilkerson, 263 F. Supp.
54 (W.D. Va. 1967). But see Mastrian v. Hedman, 326
F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Rice, 192
F. 720 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
5 Bail pending appeal is quite another matter, since
there has never been thought to be a right to it. There
have been a number of cases dealing with what criteria
ought to be used in granting or denying bail pending
appeal. See, e.g., Rehman v. California, 85 S.Ct. 8
(Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1964); Williamson v. United
States, 184 F.2d 280 (Jackson, Circuit Justice, 1950).
The appeal bail rights of the poor have also come up.
See Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 25 (Douglas, Cir-
cuit Justice), reh. 81 S.Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice,
1960), reh. 82 S.Ct. 11 (Douglas, Circuit justice), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 852 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 815,
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 831 (1962).
36 Provisions in the first group:
1) Right to bail in all cases (one state): AL.ASK CODE
Cpui. P. § 12.30.010 (1970).
2) Right to bail, except capital offenses when the proof
is evident or the presumption of guilt great (38 states):
ALA. CoNsT. art. I, § 16; Apiz. CoNsT. art. II, § 22;
Ax. CONST. art. II, § 8; CxAL. CONST. art. I, § 6; CoLo.
CONST. art. II, § 19; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8; DEL.
CoNsT. art. I, § 12; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; IDAHO
CONsT. art. I, § 6; IL. CONST. art. I, § 9; IowA CONST.
art. I, § 12; KAN. CONsT. BiLL OP RIGHTS § 9; Ky.
CoNsT. § 16; LA. CONST. art. I, § 12; M. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 10; MDu. ANN. CoDn Rule 777(a) (1970); Mnx.
CONsT. art I, § 7; Miss. CONsT. art. 1Il, § 29; Mo.
CONST. art. I, § 20; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 19; NEv.
CONST. art. I, § 7; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 597:1
(1970); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 13; N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 20; Oino CoNsT. art. I, § 9;
OKLA. CONsT. art. II, § 8; PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 14; S.C.
CoNsT. art. I, § 20; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 11; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8; VT.
CONST. ch. 2, § 32; WASH. CoNsT. art. I, § 20; W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 62-IC-1 et seq. (1970); Wis. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8; Wyo. CoNsT. art. I, § 14.
3) Right to bail, except for treason or murder (4 states):
IND. CONST. art. I, § 17; MicH. CoNsT. art. I, § 15;
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 14.
4) Right to bail, except capital or life imprisonment
offenses (one state): R.I. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
5) Right to bail, except life imprisonment without
first group resemble the language of article II of
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787: "All persons
shall be bailable, unless for capital offenses, where
the proof shall be evident, or the presumption
great." The bail provisions in the second group are
based on the common law right to bail limited only
by state constitutional provisions identical to that
of the eighth amendment: "Excessive bail shall not
be required." The District of Columbia properly
belongs in the second group. Its constitution is the
United States Constitution, and its bail provision
is that of the eighth amendment.
Several state supreme courts within the second
group have interpreted their excessive bail clauses
according to the common law." Typical of these
cases is People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City
Prison." This case summed up the earlier New
York cases to hold that the common law, as limited
by the excessive bail clause in the New York con-
stitution, does not guarantee a right to pretrial bail
in any kind of criminal case.' 9 The right to bail
parole offenses (one state): HAwAI REv. STAT. § 709-4
(1970).
Total in first group: 45 states. Provisions in the second
group:
6) Right to bail for misdemeanors, otherwise by judicial
discretion (3 states): GA. CODE AN. § 27-901 (1970);
N.Y. CODE: Cimu. P. § 553 (MeKinney 1970); VA.
CODE § 19.1-110 (1970). Georgia actually gives bail as
a matter of right for noncapital cases, by case law. Reid
v. Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27, 60 S.E.2d 151 (1950); New-
some v. Scott, 151 Ga. 639, 107 S.E. 854 (1921).
7) Bail by judicial discretion for most cases (one state):
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-102 (1969).
8) Bail by judicial discretion for most cases, except
treason is nonbailable (one state): MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 264, § 1, ch. 276, § 42 (1969). Massachusetts appar-
ently gives bail as a matter of right for all noncapital
offenses, by case law. Commonwealth v. Baker, 343
Mass. 162, 177 N.E.2d 783 (1961).
Total in second group: 5 states. All states in the sec-
ond group have excessive bail provisions: GA. CoNsT.
art. I, § 11; MAss. CONST. pt. 1, § 27; N.Y. CoNsT.
art. I, § 5; N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 14; VA. CoNsT. § 9.
From Comment, Bail: an Ancient Practice Reexa-
mined, 70 YaleL.J. 966,977-78 (1961),updated and re-
arranged.
'
1 Vanderford v. Brand, 126 Ga. 67, 54 S.E. 822(1906); Fischer v. Ball, 212 Md. 517, 129 A.2d 822
(1957); Commonwealth v. Baker, 343 Mass. 162, 177
N.E.2d 783 (1961); People ex rel. Klein v. Kruger, 25
N.Y.2d 497, 255 N.E.2d 522, 307 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1969);
People e" rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 296 N.Y. 109, 71
N.E.2d 423 (1947); People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of
City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498 (1943). See
discussions of the common law right to bail, as affected
by their own constitutions in State v. Pett, 253 Minn.
429, 92 N.W.2d 205 (1958); State v. Konigsberg, 33
N.J. 367, 164 A.2d 740 (1960).
'8290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498 (1943).
30Judge Desmond, who wrote the opinions in both
Shapiro and Lobell, supra note 37, noted that New
York's constitution was atypical because it had no
[Vol 62
PRETRIAL DETENTION
extended to all misdemeanor cases by statute,40 but
in all other cases bail was to be granted or denied
,according to judicial discretion. The court cau-
tioned, however, that judicial discretion was far
from absolute. Bail could not be denied arbitrarily
for there was an excessive bail clause in the state
constitution. There must be ample justification
stated by the judge to deny bail and the denial
must follow the ordinary practice of the courts of
the state." In People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonell,4 the
court listed factors to be considered by the judge:
the nature of the offense, its penalty, the probabil-
ity of the defendant's appearing at trial, his
pecuniary and social condition, his general reputa-
tion and the strength of the evidence against him.'s
People ex rel. Klein v. Kruger" implied yet another
condition-danger to the community.
In New York and in a few other states,45 the
common law bail system survives because the ex-
cessive bail provisions in their constitutions do not
grant a right to bail. These states have adopted the
common law generally and have not significantly
changed the common law by statute as it relates
to bail. The other states have either changed the
common law by enacting constitutional provisions
which guarantee a right to bail or achieved this
right-to-bail clause, only an excessive bail clause. Id. at
398, 49 N.E.2d at 500. Apparently, he forgot this when
he wrote in 1952 that "most states" followed this type
of discretionary rule. Desmond, Bail-Ancient and
Modern, 1 Bu r. L. Rxv. 245, 247 (1952).40 N.Y. CoDE CRnw. P. § 553 (McKinney 1970).
41290 N.Y. at 398-99, 49 N.E.2d at 501.
296 N.Y. 109, 71 N.E.2d 423 (1947).43 id. at 111, 71 N.E.2d at 425. Lobeil did more than
any English case did up to the time of Blackstone in
listing the factors a judge may properly consider in ex-
ercising his judicial discretion. For example, Highmore
discussed in great detail the classes of offenses for which
bail must be granted or denied, the power of the judge
to grant or deny bail, and the strict penalties for a
judge's abuse of his discretion, but he never said a word
about how a judge should make his decision. See A.
HIGHmORE, A DIGEST Or T DocannE o BAIL 147-
69,169-86,187-94 (1791).
44 25 N.Y.2d 497, 502 255 N.E.2d 552, 555-56, 307
N.Y.S.2d 207, 212 (19695. This hint was picked up by a
trial judge to detain before trial a person charged with
several skyscraper bombings. People v. Melville, 62
Misc.2d 366, 308 N.Y.S.2d 671, 678 (N.Y.C. CRim. CT.
1970). If not overruled, this case will become a prec-
cedent for pretrial detention solely on the basis of
danger to the community, at least as far as the common
law of New York is concerned. But see United States v.
Melville, 309 F. Supp. 824; 309 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); 306 F. Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), where the
district judges were struggling with the Bail Reform
Act.
45See note 36 supra, paras. 6-8.
result by statute.46 The District of Columbia re-
mains in the common law bail system category
since the Federal Constitution nowhere specifically
guarantees a right to bail. It only protects7 against
against excessive bail. Although the judiciary Act
of 1789 created a right to bail for all noncapital
federal offenses, that statutory right can be altered
without contravening the eighth amendment exces-
sive bail clause. The District's pretrial detention
law only returns to judges some of the discretion-
ary power to deny bail that they held at common
law in 1791 when the eighth amendment was
ratified.48
41 See note 36 supra, paras. 1-5. Cf. Lessee of Levy v.
McCarter, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 102 (1832), where justice
Story held that the New York statute of descents had
effectively repealed the statute of descents of William
III. In New York, for example, there is a right to bail
for all misdemeanors, by statute. People ex rel. Shapiro
v. Keeper of City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498(1943). In North Carolina, there was a provision in the
constitution of 1776 guaranteeing the right to bail. This
was left out of the 1868 constitution, which leaves the
right to bail uncertain in that state. See State v. Hera-
don, 107 N.C. 934, 12 S.E. 268 (1890).
4 ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91.
48An argument can be made that the United States
Constitution, as a separate entity, the constitution of
the District of Columbia, should be interpreted accord-
ing to the District's common law. That common law
was taken from Maryland by the Act of Feb. 27, 1801,
ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 103, which provides "that the laws
of the state of Maryland, as they then existed, should
be, and continue in force in that part of the [D]istrict
which was ceded by that state." Lee v. Lee, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 44 (1834). The act is now codified as D.C. CoDE-
§ 49-301 (1966).
The laws of Maryland included the common law of
England, as it existed on July 4, 1776. Mm. CoNsT.
DEcr.. RiGHTS art. 5. The common law was adopted
subject to changes by the state legislature, but none
were made until the codification of 1810. See Assoc. of
Western Ry. v. Riss & Co., 320 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir.
1963); Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 824 (1942); Coomes v.
Clements, 4 Harr. & J. 480 (Md. 1819).
Maryland has not changed the common law rules of
bail other than by an excessive bail clause in its consti-
tution, so the courts there still have judicial discretion
over bail. Fischer v. Ball, 212 Md. 517, 129 A.2d 822
(1957). Maryland rule of court 777, which guarantees a
pretrial right to bail for all but capital offenses, does not
have the force of a statute since it is only a judicial de-
termination about the granting of bail. Id.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 has granted a right to bail
in noncapital cases in the District of Columbia from the
time of its establishment in 1801. However, the inter-
pretation of the eighth amendment excessive bail clause
depends on the District's common law, not on its
statutes. Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral
Foundation, 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1950). While the
District's courts have never ruled on the common law
as it relates to bail, Maryland's highest court has done
so in Fischer v. Ball. The lower District courts, in the
absence of a clear statement by the Supreme Court or
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, must
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The early common law interpretation of the
excessive bail clause is logically sound when it
is viewed apart from recent interpretations by
state courts. The interpretation suggested by the
majority in Carlson v. Landon-that Congress
could deny the right to bail to some categories of
offenses-is untenable. This would allow the
protection of the eighth amendment excessive
bail clause to be emasculated by a statute re-
quiring denial of bail.
49
To the minority of the Court, the above inter-
pretation made no sense because it would reduce
the excessive bail clause to a "pious admonition." 50
Therefore, they believed that an absolute right to
bail must be inferred.,' Those adhering to the
minority's interpretation rejected the idea that
the excessive bail clause was obviously copied
from the English Bill of Rights of 1688,5 but they
could find no direct evidence that the authors of
the American Bill of Rights thought there was
any difference.P The Northwest Ordinance of 1787
and the judiciary Act of 1789 explicitly guarantee
a right to bail. There is no good explanation why
the eighth amendment, passed by Congress just a
few days before it passed the judiciary Act, should
be so vague in comparison on the subject of bail
rights, if one is to infer fairly a right to bail from
it.54
The common law approach to the interpretation
defer to the Maryland courts' determination of the
common law. Watkins v. Rives, 125 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1941); In re PameU's Est., 275 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C.
1967); Gerace v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp.
95 (D.D.C. 1966). The Maryland court's conclusion in
Fischer v. Ball was that the excessive bail clause did not
imply a right to bail in any kind of criminal case. As in
the New York cases, see text accompanying notes 38-44
supra, it was cautioned that bail cannot be denied ar-
bitrarily, but only in the exercise of sound judicial dis-
cretion. The District's pretrial detention law only al-
lows the exercise of such discretion when it says, "ajudicialofficer may order pretrial detention." D.C. CoDF
§ 23-1322(a) (emphasis added).
49 Foote, The Coning Constitutimal Crisis in Bail,
113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 969 (1965).
50 342 U.S. 524, 556. This view has been espoused in
an incorrect dictum in Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp.
483, 484 (D.D.C. 1960), dealing with bail rights ofjuveniles. The court cited a passage in Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951), which spoke to the right to bail in
noncapital cases under federal law. That federal law is
found in the judiciary Act of 1789 and its successors,
however. It is not in the eighth amendment.
' See 342 U.S. at 556.
62 Id. at 557.
63 Foote, supra note 49, at 989. Professor Foote ex-
plains this only with general statements by the framers
of the Bill of Rights that it was meant to give more
protection than its English counterpart. Id. at 985-88.
"Id. at 971. See Note, supra note 18, at 1500.
of the excessive bail clause is not as extreme as
either the majority or the minority position in
Carlson v. Landon. Under modern conditions,
while a judge supposedly has considerable discre-
tion in deciding whether or not to grant bail, he
may not deny bail without good cause.5 5 His
discretion has been reduced as the common law
on bail evolved. In New York, where there is
enough reported case law to analyze the process
of that evolution, there is a strong presumption in
favor of granting bail, 58 with a full hearing deemed
necessary before bail may properly be denied 7
55 The common law approach has been dismissed as
a "widely-held interpretation which fails to give effec-
tive protection even against judicial action, let alone
possible legislative abuse." Foote, supra note 49, at 970.
This is belied by the courts' practice. Id. at 979 n. 102,
citing one of his bail studies, supra note 12, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. at 697-98.56 People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison,
290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498 (1943).
7 People ex rel. Singer v. Corbett, 26 App. Div.2d
770,271 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1966); People v. Bach, 61 Misc.2d
630, 306 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Dutchess Co. Ct. 1970).
The early nineteenth century New York courts fol-
lowed the common law as it was summarized in the
eighteenth century. See 4 W. BiAc sTONE, Cou-
mENTARms oN TE LAw or ENGLAND *29&-300 (Jones
ed. 1916); 1 J. CErrr, CuanNAL LAw *93-99 (5th
Amer. ed. 1847); 2 W. HAwxms, PLEAs or THE COWN
ch. 15, § § 40 et seq., 80 (6th ed. 1788). The rule was
that if it stands indifferent whether a person
charged with a felony is guilty or not, he ought to
be bailed; and that even in capital cases, where
there is any circumstance to induce the court to
suppose he may be innocent, they will bail; and
that the judges will in general exercise the power
of bailing in favor of a prisoner in every case not
capital, though they will not exercise it when the
prisoner is notoriously guilty, by his own con-
fession or otherwise, without the existence of some
special causes to induce it.
People v. Goodwin, 1 Wh. Cr. Cas. 434, 445-46 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1820). See Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1825); People v. Dixon, 4 Park. Cr. Rep. 651
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856); People v. Van Home, 8 Barb.
158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); People v. Lohman, 2 Barb.
450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848). Interestingly, in the leading
case, People v. Goodwin, the court was of the view that
the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy
was applicable to the states, since the United States
Constitution and its amendments were the supreme law
of the land. People v. Goodwin, 1 Wh. Cr. Cas. 470(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
There was a considerable softening of this position
in the early twentieth century cases. See People ex rd.
Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393, 49
N.E.2d 498 (1943); People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of
City Prison, 265 App. Div. 474, 482, 39 N.Y.S.2d 526,
533 (1943) (dissenting opinion); Amer. Civil Liberties
Union v. McAdoo, 229 App. Div. 511, 514, 242 N.Y.S.
696, 699 (1930) (dissenting opinion); People ex rel.
Ackerson v. Warden of City Prison, 167 Misc. 475, 3
N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1937). But see People v. Mott,
97 Misc. 86, 162 N.Y.S. 272 (Sup. Ct. 1916); People v.




The major concern about the common law
approach is the ability of the judges to exercise
discretion properly. Justice Black in particular
was motivated to infer a right to bail from the
excessive bail clause because he distrusted the
ability of trial judges to deny bail fairly in the
McCarthy era." But it should be no more difficult
for a trial judge to interpret the phrase "excessive
bail" than it has been to interpret such phrases
as "due process of law." Trial judges are charged
with the duty of determining in the first instance
exactly what amount of bail is or is not excessive.
With the quick appeal guaranteed by the pretrial
detention law, improper detention orders should
receive prompt enough appellate determination
to prevent injustice. 59
CoNsnTIuTioNAniTY ol PI PjAr DETENTION:
PRocmDuAL AsPEcTs
A number of objections to pretrial detention
can be raised as possible violations of the pro-
cedural guaranties of the fifth, sixth, and eighth
amendments. Regarding the sixth amendment
right to counsel, the District of Columbia pretrial
detention law does provide for representation by
counsel at the pretrial hearing." It also allows
the defendant himself temporary release to help
prepare his defense. 61 But there are more subtle
ways to hinder the preparation of a defense than
flat denials of access to counsel. Placing counsel
under the burden of talking with his client only
in the inconvenient and uncomfortable confines of
a county jail has a deleterious effect on his at-
titude towards the client and the case. 2 At the
61342 U.S. at 558. Justice Black is still concerned:
I realize that it is far easier to substitute individualjudges' ideas of 'fairness' for the fairness prescribed
by the Constitution, but I shall not at any time
surrender my belief that that document itself
should be our guide, not our own concept of what
is fair, decent, and right.... As I have said time
and time again, I prefer to put my faith in the
written words of the Constitution itself, rather
than to rely on the shifting, day-to-day standards
of fairness of individual judges.
it; re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-78 (1970) (dissenting
opinion).59 See D.C. CODE § 23-1324.60Id. § 23-1322(c) (4).61 d. § 23-1321(h) (2) states, in part:
[Flor good cause shown, [the person detained]
shall be released upon order of the judicial officer
in the custody of the United States marshall or
other appropriate person for limited periods of
time to prepare defenses or for other proper rea-
sons.
12Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail,
113 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1125, 1147 (1965); Portman, supra
note 3, at 248.
same time, the defendant might be discouraged by
his lawyer's attitude and the atmosphere of the
jail. When the accused is released to help with his
defense, he is ordinarily placed in the custody of a
United States marshal. There is, then, an oppor-
tunity for official interference.6 Much will depend
on whether the sixty-day limit on detention is
short enough to obviate serious harm, and on
what official attitudes are effected in temporarily
releasing defendants.
There is a combined question of eighth amend-
ment cruel and unusual punishment and fifth
amendment due process in the pretrial imprison-
ment itself. Imprisonment for only sixty days is
probably not cruel and unusual. Only when the
length of time served is far out of proportion to
the normal penalty have the courts found the
fact of imprisonment to be cruel and unusual."
Whether any imprisonment before conviction,
no matter how short, is a violation of due process
of law depends upon a balancing of the rights of
the acquitted detainees with the rights of society.
Apparently, the period of pretrial detention will
be deducted from the convicted detainee's sen-
tence.15 The acquitted detainee can get no credit
for time served, nor any other type of compensa-
tion. Confinement of an innocent person has
always been avoided by the courts. 68 Hence, a
"Portman, supra note 3, at 247, poses the hypo-
thetical of a black defendant, accompanied by two
white policemen in uniform, looking for someone he
knows only as "Charlie" in the midst of the black
ghetto. Cf. United States ex tel. Hyde v. McMann,
263 F.2d 940 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. United
States ex tel. Hyde v. Lavallee, 360 U.S. 937 (1959)
(defendant in custody of policeman, looking for a
prostitute known as "Jo Ann" on lower west side of
New York City).
, See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910);
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (dissent-
ing opinion of Field, J.); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d
92 (6th Cir. 1957). Cf. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30
(1970) (8 years between indictment and trial yields
cognizable claim under sixth amendment speedy trial
clause); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (6 years);
Comment, The Convict's Right to a Speedy Trial, 61
J. CRn. L.C. & P.S. 352, 360 (1970).
65 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (Supp. 1, 1966), applied by
former D.C. CODE § 23-909, which applied the whole
Bail Reform Act to the District of Columbia, including
§ 3568. However, under the codification, §§ 23-901-08
are replaced by §§ 23-1301-08, § 23-909 is omitted, and
§§ 23-1321-32 are applied to the District in lieu of
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-52. § 3568 has not been put into the
new codification anywhere, but ought to apply, absent
a specific restriction in the District of Columbia Code,
as a federal statute applicable to all federal jurisdic-
tions.
66 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (concurring
opinion); Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277 (1895); Ex
parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39, 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1825)
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great deal will depend upon how carefully District
of Columbia judges conduct pretrial detention
hearings.
Another due process question is the reasonable-
ness of the criteria the judge must consider at the
pretrial detention hearing. 7 Danger to specific
persons" is a judicially established criterion for
denying bail.6' Several Supreme Court justices
have focused on yet another factor in dealing with
applications for bail pending appeal30-- danger to
(concurring opinion). Blackstone, too, was concerned:[I]n this dubious interval between the commit-
ment and trial, a prisoner ought to be used with
the utmost humanity, and neither be loaded with
needless fetters nor subjected to other hardships
than such as are absolutely requisite for the pur-
pose of confinement only.
4 BLACKSTONE, COMaENTARIES ON TaE LAW Or
ENGLAND *300 (Jones ed. 1916).
More recently, dealing with the District of Columbia
Sexual Psychopath Act, Judge Bazelon has said that
when a determination of 'dangerousness' will result
in a deprivation of liberty, no court can afford to
ignore the very real constitutional problems sur-
rounding incarceration predicated only upon a
supposed propensity to commit criminal acts.
Incarceration may not seem 'punishment' to thejailers, but it is punishment to the jailed. Incar-
ceration for a mere propensity is punishment not
for acts, but for status, and punishment for status
is hardly favored in our society. (footnotes
omitted).
Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
Judge Burger (now Chief Justice) denied that this
was purely preventive detention for anticipated con-
duct alone, and warned against "substituting our own
predilections concerning psychiatry" for the policy
judgments of the legislature. Id. at 1109.67There has been a great deal of discussion about
the reasonableness of the classification of offenses in
§ 23-1322(a) which are subject to pretrial detention.
Hickey, supra note 3, at 310-13; Mitchell, supra note
3, at 1235-37; Tribe, supra note 3, at 382-83. Once
the limits of constitutional discretion under the ex-
cessive bail clause are established, however, it is not
the class of offense which is the constitutional problem,
but how judicial discretion is exercised within that
class. A judge cannot sweep the streets of all persons
charged with a particular offense, but must analyze
each case separately and withhold bail only for the
best of reasons. Otherwise, he will be violating the ex-
cessive bail clause of the eighth amendment. Uniformly
high bail for a whole class of offenders was the vice
condemned in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). See
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 558 (1952) (dissent-
ing opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
r4D.C. CODE § 23-1322(b)(2)(B).
69 Fernandez v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 642 (Harlan,
Circuit Justice, 1961) (threatening witnesses); United
States v. Rice, 192 F. 720 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).70 Sellers v. United States, 89 S.Ct. 36 (Black, Cir-
cuit justice, 1968); Rehman v. California, 85 S.Ct. 8
(Douglas, Circuit justice, 1964); Carbo v. United
States, 82 S.Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962);
Leigh v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 994 (Warren, Circuit
Justice, 1962). But see Williamson v. United States,
184 F.2d 280, 282 (Jackson, Circuit Justice, 1950):
the community. 1 Conceptually, both categories
make good sense when added to the traditional
criteria which aid the judge in deciding whether
to release the defendant on bail.
Finding out whether a defendant is a danger
to the community is not easy, however. Evidence
of a defendant's direct threats to witnesses and
others constitutes the obvious but exceptional
case. Inveterate drug addicts, listed under § 23-
1323, are not entirely free from compulsion, so
that for them, Attorney General Mitchell's al-
lusion to civil commitment is not as illogical as it
sounds.72 For other offenders, pretrial detention
is a matter of predicting the individual's future
voluntary behavior. No psychological test yet
devised reveals whether someone accused of
armed bank robbery, for example, will repeat
the crime or commit a different offense within a
specified period of time.78 Limiting the application
of pretrial detention to certain classes of offenses
provides a judge no help in deciding which offenders
in those classes are dangerous. While "the insight
and experience of trial judges" 7 4 represents the
predictive tool which criminologists lack, it is
uncertain whether this tool will achieve "fun-
damental fairness" 7 . in deciding which offender
is so dangerous to the community that he must
be detained. This problem can be avoided only
if pretrial detention is used sparingly, in the
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted
but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented
in this country and so fraught with danger of ex-
cesses that I am loath to resort to it, even as a dis-
cretionary judicial technique to supplement con-
viction of such offenses as those of which defend-
ants stand convicted.7
'D.C. CODE § 23-1322(b)(2)(B).
72 Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1233.
SStudnts of recidivism have tried to find out how
to predict commission of future crimes, but most of
their work has been on a statistical level of factor
analysis for groups, rather than for individuals. See,
e.g., Carney, Predicting Recidivism in a Medium Secur-
ity Correctional Institution, 58 J. Cnms. L.C. & P.S. 338(1967); Unkovic & Dursay, An Application of Con-
figurational Analysis to the Recidivism of Juvenile De-
linquent Behavior, 60 J. Cmm. L.C. & P.S. 340 (1969).
But see Arnold, A Functional Explanation of Recidivism,
56 J. Cmm. L.C. & P.S. 59 (1965).
Sen. Hruska is not worried about the ability of trialjudges to predict future behavior, since they have to
make predictions when they suspend sentences, grant
probation, or set bail. Hruska, supra note 3, at 53.
Predicting that a person will not commit another crime
after conviction and predicting that he will not try to
flee trial are not the same, however, as trying to pre-
dict that he will commit another crime within sixty
days after indictment.74 Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1241.75 Id. at 1242.
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clearest cases of danger to specific individuals
or the general public. The requirement that
there be "clear and convincing" evidence of
danger76 may not be discriminating enough to
fulfill due process, but evidence of danger beyond
a reasonable doubt ought to be satisfactory.7
CONCLUSION
Pretrial detention does not violate the eighth
amendment protection against excessive bail as
that amendment is interpreted under the common
law of the District of Columbia. All that the pre-
trial detention law effects is a partial repeal of the
federal statute rendering bail mandatory for
defendants in noncapital cases. It simply grants
judges a limited power to deny bail before trial, a
power which they held under the common law
before 1789. This result is similar to the situation
which currently exists in the five states which
allow considerable discretion to their judges
in granting or denying bail."
While the law does not violate the excessive
bail clause, some procedural difficulties may arise
including interference with right to counsel and
punishment before conviction based on predictions
of future criminal conduct. None of these problems
is an insuperable obstacle to finding pretrial
detention constitutional on its face. Although a
pretrial detention order is guaranteed immediate
review by the appellate court, 0 the order is to be
"affirmed if it is supported by the proceedings
below." 80 The trial courts will thus normally
make the final determinations about detention for
good or ill. It is possible that this quick appellate
review could produce a backlog of cases, a backlog
which might outlast the sixty-day detention period
76 D.C. CODE § 23-1322(b) (2).
77 Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), where the
Supreme Court found the evidentiary standard of
"beyond a reasonable doubt" to be constitutionally
necessary at trial.78 See note 36 supra, paras. 6-8.
79 D.C. CODE § 23-1323(b).
80 The detainee must be released after sixty days
unless the trial has started, or the defendant has de-
layed it with motions other than continuances. Id.§ 23-1322(d)(1) (A). At least one of the law's backers in
Congress displayed a willingness to limit appellate
review:
Another benefit of this proposal is that it will
eliminate appellate review by the U.S. Court of
Appeals. This Court of Appeals is notorious. Get-
ting a conviction past judge Bazelon and Judge
Wright is like passing a ship between Scylla and
Charybdis.
116 CONG. REc. H1965 (daily ed., Mar. 19, 1970)(statement of Rep. Broyhill).
and render the appeal moot." It should not,
however, be presumed beforehand that pretrial
detention will be administered unconstitutionallyP
Pretrial detention, if used judiciously, should
complement the changes in the bail system oc-
casioned by the Bail Reform Act of 1966. Under
the money bail system, trial judges could, and
often did, set excessive bail to keep "dangerous"
offenders in jail before trial.P After the Bail Reform
Act became law, excessive bail was not so readily
imposed because, with the setting of money bail
the exceptional case, a high bail figure attracted
more attention on appeal.84 Yet there was never
any constitutional right to bail in all noncapital
cases, nor was there any good reason why public
safety, when actually endangered, could not be
taken into account in determining pretrial release.
Under the District of Columbia law, judges may
now do openly what they have always done under
the pretense of assuring appearance at trial.
As outlined herein, pretrial detention cannot
be used constitutionally to rid the streets of possi-
ble offenders. This may be contrary to the inten-
tions of the authors of the law, who were searching
for a change in the Bail Reform Act
to protect those innocent members of our society
who might be victims of an accused criminal whose
character and background showed high recidivist
tendencies. 5
Bail cannot be denied an accused on a mere sus-
picion that he may commit another crime. There
must be a clear and convincing showing that he
is so dangerous to the community that no less
stringent measure, such as supervised custody or
nighttime confinement, 6 will adequately protect
81 See note 36 supra, paras. 6-8.
8 The bail system has been used in the past for
political ends, however, and it is possible that pretrial
detention, especially if the sixty-day time limit is ever
removed, could be used the same way against "sub-
versives" and minorities. See R. GoLDPARB, RANsom:
A CRITIQUE or TBE AwERIcAN BAtr. SYs=IE 49-81
(1965). Judge Crockett has vividly described the effects
of racism on the bail system in an account of his con-
troversial actions during mass arrests in Detroit in
1969. Crockett, A Black Judge Speaks, 53 J. Am. JVD.
Soc'y. 360 (1970).
83 Hickey, supra note 3, at 288; Portman, so-pra note
3, at 226.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Melville, 306 F. Supp.
124 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).85Mitchell, Wiretapping and Pretrial Detention-
Balancing the Rights of the Individual with the Rights
of Society, 53 J. Am. Jon. Soc'r. 188, 191 (1969).8GSee D.C. CODE § 23-1321(a).
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society. While pretrial detention may be a useful
tool for certain circumstances s7 it is not, if judi-
ciously applied, the crime-fighting tool many of
its proponents intended it to be.
7 For example, in the forty-one states whose con-
stitutions declare a right to bail, supra note 36 (Mary-
land, New Hampshire, and West Virginia, in para. 2,
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and Hawaii, in para. 5, grant this right only by statute),
the abolition of the death penalty has been thought to
guarantee a right to bail before trial for all offenders.
State v. Pett, 253 Minn. 429, 92 N.W.2d 205 (1958);
City of Sioux Falls v. Marshall, 48 S.D. 378, 204 N.W.
999 (1925). If the death penalty were abolished in the
District of Columbia, the result would have been the
same under 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (Supp. II, 1966), but for
the pretrial detention law.
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THE THREE-JUDGE COURT ACT OF 1910: PURPOSE,
PROCEDURE AND ALTERNATIVES
INTRODUCTION
In the Three-Judge Court Act of 1910, Congress
provided for an extraordinary measure to safe-
guard state legislation from hasty invalidation by
federal judges.' In its present form as Section 2281
of the judicial Code, the measure provides that an
injunction restraining the enforcement of a state
statute on constitutional grounds can only be
issued by a district court composed of three judges,2
The jurisdiction of the special court is determined
by a single district judge from the allegations of
the complaint.' If he is satisfied that a certain case
is one for three judges, the district judge requests
the chief judge of the circuit to appoint a circuit
judge and another district judge to sit with the
requesting judge as a three-judge court.4 Upon an
'Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557.
(The Act is formally referred to as the Mann-Elkins
Bill.) The 1910 Act was not the first three-judge court
measure provided by Congress. In 1903, Congress re-
quired three-judge courts to be convened to hear anti-
trust and railroad cases which were considered im-
portant by the Attorney General. Act of Feb. 11, 1903,
ch. 544 § 1, 32 Stat. 823. In 1906, Congress provided
for a three-judge court to hear cases wherein orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission were attacked.
Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, § 5, 34 Stat. 592.
2 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction re-
straining the enforcement, operation, or execution
of any State statute by restraining the action of
any officer of such State in the enforcement or ex-
ecution of such statute or of an order made by an
administrative board or commission acting under
State statutes, shall not be granted by any district
court or judge thereof upon the ground of the un-
constitutionality of such statute unless the applica-
tion therefor is heard and determined by a district
court of three judges under section 2284 of this
title.
'Erz parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539
(1911).
4 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964) describes how the court
is to be formed, and the function of each judge. The
relevant parts of this Section provide:
In any action or proceeding required by Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district
court of three judges the composition and proce-
dure of the court ... shall be as follows:
(1) The district judge to whom the application
for injunction or other relief is presented shall con-
stitute one member of such court. On the filing of
the application, he shall immediately notify the
chief judge of the circuit, who shall designate two
other judges, at least one of whom shall be a circuit
judge. Such judges shall serve as members of the
20.
order of the three-judge court which either grants
or denies an interlocutory or permanent injunc-
tion, direct appeal to the Supreme Court may be
taken by any party.5
While dear in conception, the Three-judge Act
has proven complex in application. The confusion
stems from a long line of Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of the Act which have had a negative effect
on the Act's operation. Specifically, the Court has
established numerous threshold prerequisites to
the convening of a three-judge court which are
both complex and unworkable. These standards
have in turn made appeals from district courts
more frequent. The appellate structure associated
with the three-judge court, however, is inadequate
to deal with such appeals. As a result, litigants
often find themselves involved in time-consuming
and expensive appeals on the threshold question of
whether or not they should be in a three-judge
court. Notwithstanding these procedural problems,
the Act has placed a strain on judicial resources by
providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court
of a final decision of the statutory court, and, to a
court to hear and determine the action or pro-
ceeding.
(3) In any such case in which an application for
an interlocutory injunction is made, the districtjudge to whom the application is made may, at any
time, grant a temporary restraining order to pre-
vent irreparable damage. The order, unless pre-
viously revoked by the district judge, shall remain
in force only until the hearing and determination
by the full court ....
(5) Any one of the three judges of the court may
perform all functions, conduct all proceedings ex-
cept the trial, and enter all orders required or per-
mitted by the rules of civil procedure. A single
judge shall not appoint a master or order a refer-
ence, or hear and determine any application for an
interlocutory injunction or motion to vacate the
same, or dismiss the action, or enter a summary or
final judgment. The action of a single judge shall
be reviewable by the full court at any time before
final hearing.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party
may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order
granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an
interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil
action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district
court of three judges.
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lesser extent, by providing for three judges to
perform the work of one.
This comment will address itself to the question
of whether the benefits of the Three-Judge Act
justify its continued existence in light of the
burdens the Act has placed on courts and litigants
alike. A first section will explore the purposes of
the Three-Judge Act, both as they existed at the
Act's passage and as they exist today. A second
section will attempt to order some of the procedural
difficulties which surround the special court. It
will include an analysis of the discretion of a single
district judge in summoning a three-judge court,
as well as the appellate review of one-judge and
three-judge decisions associated with the special
court. A third section will suggest two alternatives
by which the benefits of the Act might be retained
with fewer costs to the courts and prospective
litigants. The first alternative will assume retention
of the Three-Judge Act, while the second will be
founded on its abrogation.
I. THE PURposE OF THE THR-EE-JUDGE COURT AcT
Shortly after the turn of the century, the Su-
preme Court in Ex parts Young' rendered a de-
cision which delighted the commercial powers of
the day. In essence, the Court held that a state
officer could be enjoined by a federal court from
enforcing a state statute deemed objectionable to
the federal constitution. As a result of this decision,
the states were impaired in their ability to regulate
commerce within their borders. This occurred be-
cause every time state legislation was enacted
which was directed at the regulation of business,
carefully selected federal judges sympathetic to
business interests would enjoin the enforcement of
the regulatory enactments. 7 Consequently, as the
number of injunctions grew so did the anger of state
legislators, who resented having "one little federal
judge" 8 enjoining their state regulatory schemes.
6 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
7 Indicative of the sentiments of state officers was a
remark made by Governor Byrnes of South Dakota
in his inaugural address:
It was the boast of representatives of the railroads
that in 13 minutes after the governor had signed
at Pierre the act fixing passenger shares at 2 cents
per mile the Federal judge at Sioux Falls had signed
his sweeping order restraining the Attorney Gen-
eral and all State attorneys from attempting to
enforce it.
49 CoNG. Ec. 4773 (1913) as quoted from Note, The
Three Jiudge District Court and Appellate Review, 49 VA.
L. REv. 538, 540 (1963).
845 CONG. REc. 7256 (1910) (remarks of Senator
Overman).
It was out of this anger that the Three-Judge Act
was born.9
The immediate purpose for the passage of the
Act was to prevent business from using the in-
junction to avoid state taxation statutes, and other
state regulation. The broader purpose for the
Act's passage was to harmonize federal-state
regulations."' The three-judge measure was thought
to assure these goals by offering the states the more
thorough deliberation of three federal judges," as
well as direct review in the Supreme Court of the
special court's decisions.1
2
9 In the judiciary Act of 1937, Congress passed a
twin three-judge court provision requiring three judges
to entertain suits which sought to enjoin the enforce-
ment of an Act of Congress. Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch.
754, 50 Stat. 752. The passage of the Act was prompted
by fears of Congress that New Deal Legislation would
be invalidated by single federal judges. Why the three-judge measure was thought to achieve this end is not
dear. For in the same Act there were other measures
which substantially mitigated against any protective
advantage Congress might have sought from a three-
judge court. The first section of the Judiciary Act of
1937 gave the Government the right to intervene in
any suit in which an Act of Congress was attacked on
constitutional grounds, and the second section provided
for direct appeal to the Supreme Court whenever an
Act of Congress was declared unconstitutional. [Each
of these measures has been retained with slight changes.
The first section is now 24 U.S.C. § 2403 (1964), and
the second is 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1964). The three-judge
measure is presently incorporated in 28 U.S.C. § 2282
(1964).] Although the first two sections of the Judici-
ary Act of 1937 were subject to extensive debate, the
lack of controversy generated by the three-judge pro-
vision has led a number of commentators to conclude
that it was added as an afterthought. See Comment,
The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litiga-
tion: A Procedural Anachronism, 27 U. Cm. L. Pxv. 555,
563 and Note, supra note 7, at 544. It has been further
argued that there is no need to provide a mediating
device between two branches of the same government.
A.L.I., STuDy or Tmx DiVSON O JURISDICTION BE-
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COuRTs. Commentary
§ 1374 at 248 (April 1968 Draft). The American Law
Institute has advocated that the three-judge court
provision with respect to federal acts be abolished, but
that the three-judge provision regarding state statutes
be retained. A.L.I. STUDY supra.
'0 As Senator Overman commented:
Whenever one judge stands up in a state and en-
joins the governors and the attorney general, the
people resent it, and public sentiment is stirred, as
it was in my state, when there was almost a rebel-
lion, whereas if three judges declare that a statute
is unconstitutional the people would rest easy under
it.
45 CoNG. Rxc. 7256 (1910).
u See remarks of Senator Brown, 45 CONG. Rxc.
7257 (1910), and Senator Overman, 45 CONG. 1xc.
7256 (1910).
"C Professor Currie points out that speedy appeal to
the Supreme Court was emphasized in arguments on
behalf of the Expediting Act of 1903 where direct
appeal was first provided for three-judge court de-
cisions. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Con-
stitutional Litigation. 32 U. Ca. L. REV. 1 75.
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While it has been persuasively argued that the
specific purpose for which the Act was passed has
been outdated by subsequent legislation," the
more general purpose for the passage of the Act is
as valid today as it was in 1910. It seems likely
that state legislators would be no more content to
see single federal judges enjoining the operation
of apportionment plans, welfare schemes, and civil
rights statutes today than they were to see a single
judge enjoin their taxation plans in 1910. The
special court can, therefore, still be viewed as an
important palliative between the Federal Govern-
ment and the states. Furthermore, the three-
judge court has in recent years become of special
value to civil rights groups and welfare litigants
who desire the ready access to the Supreme Court
which the Act provides for. During the October
1969 term of the Supreme Court, thirteen cases
arising under Section 2281 were treated by the
Court on the merits. 4 Of these, seven cases in-
volved civil rights and welfare class actions.15
"3See Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in
Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural Anachronism,
27 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 555, 559 (1960). It is argued that
the Johnson Act of 1934, and Tax Injunction Act of
1937 substantially foreclosed district court adjudica-
tion of suits which sought to enjoin the enforcement of
state public utility rate orders and state tax collection.
It was just these sorts of suits which prompted the
1910 Act.
14 Gunn v. University Committee to End the War in
Vietnam, 399 U.S. 383 (1970) (disorderly conduct
statute attacked by War protesters); Evans v. Corn-
man, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (Maryland voting require-
ment attacked); Wyman v. Rothstein, 398 U.S. 275(1970) (disparity in New York welfare payments
attacked); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) (Cal-
ifornia determination of AFDC payments attacked);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Maryland
limit on AFDC payments attacked); Wheeler v. Mont-
gomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (Administrative procedure
challenged with respect to eligibility to obtain old age
benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)(denial of hearing to AFDC recipients attacked); Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Fruit and
Vegetable statute challenged); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397
U.S. 82 (1970) (Alaskan fishing statute challenged);
Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471 (1970) (New York Sur-
rogate Court Procedure Act attacked); Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1969) (Statute authorizing jury
selection methods challenged); Carter v. Commission
of Green County, 396 U.S. 320 (1969) (Statute author-
izing jury selection methods challenged); Hall v. Beals,
396 U.S. 45 (1969) (Colorado residency voting require-
ment attacked).
15 Wyman v. Rothstein, 398 U.S. 275 (1970); Lewis
v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S.
280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1969); Carter v. jury
Commission of Green County, 396 U.S. 320 (1969).
I. TIE OPERATION OF THE THRE-JuDGE CouRT
In determining whether or not the continued
existence of the Three-Judge Act can be justified,
the finding that the Act serves a useful function is
merely the point of departure. For if in the opera-
tion of the Act its benefits prove so illusory that
they are outweighed by the costs which the three-
judge court imposes on judicial resources, the Act
should be abolished. This section will analyse the
viability of the three-judge court in light of its
operation.
A. To Convene or Not to Convene a Three-Judge
Court-The Plight of the District Judge
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Three-
Judge Act in Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co."
In that case, the Court made the role of the district
judge in convening a three-judge court a simple
one. It held that whenever an injunction against
the enforcement of a state statute was sought on
the ground of the unconstitutionality of that
statute, a three-judge court was to be convened.17
The discretion of the single judge was to be limited
to ascertaining whether or not federal jurisdiction
existed in each case.
Since Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., the
Supreme Court has expanded the discretion of a
single judge to convene a three-judge court con-
siderably. As a result, district judges must now
make detailed and confusing inquiries with respect
to three-judge court jurisdiction. The following
16 220 U.S. 539 (1911).
1"Section 2281 merely states that a single judge
cannot grant an interlocutory or permanent injunction.
It was the contention of the district judge in Metro-
politan that he had the authority to deny injunctive
relief under the 1910 Act. The Supreme Court, in a
mandamus proceeding, made it quite clear, however,
that the Act forbade a district judge from either grant-
ing or denying injunctive relief.
We find no ... implication anywhere in the sectionjustifying that there was an intention on the part
of Congress that the single justice or judge...
need not call to his assistance two other judges...
in the event that he was of opinion that the claim
of the unconstitutionality of the statute was un-
tenable. On the contrary, the statute evidences
the purpose that the application... should be
heard.., whether the claim of unconstitutionality
be or not be meritorious ..
220 U.S. 539, 545 (1911).
The Second Circuit has recently departed from this
interpretation of the 1910 Act. In Astro Cinema Corp.
v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970), the court
reached the conclusion that a three-judge court should
have been convened under present tests of three-judge
court jurisdiction but, nevertheless, refused to convene
a three-judge court on the ground that the three-judge
provision should not apply to instances in which a
single judge does not grant injunctive relief.
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analysis focuses on this development and cor-
respondingly examines the difficult questions which
a single judge must decide before a three-judge
court can be convened.
1. The Substantial Question Doctrine
In 1933, the Supreme Court in the landmark
decision of Ex parte Poresky8 decided that in order
for a three-judge court to be convened the con-
stitutional challenge to a state statute must be a
substantial one. In so ruling, the Court circum-
vented the words of the Three-judge Act which
make no allusion to substantial constitutional
questions. The Court reasoned that a constitu-
tional claim which was insubstantial did not raise a
case or controversy, and in the absence of a case or
controversy federal question jurisdiction could not
be invoked.19 Although the Court's rationale has
not worn well,20 the substantial question inquiry
has been universally adopted2' despite what some
commentators consider an attempt to abrogate
Poresky in a 1942 amendment to the Three-Judge
Act.
22
1 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
19 Id. at 32. The Court indicated, however, that where
federal jurisdiction exists independently of federal
question jurisdiction, the substantiality test was not
to be applied. Id.
20 In Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962), the
Court permitted a single judge to enjoin the enforce-
ment of a state statute when no substantial question
existed with respect to the statute's constitutionality.
Under the Poresky rationale, however, a district judge
does not have jurisdiction to entertain a claim which
does not raise a substantial constitutional question, and
could not, therefore enjoin the enforcement of a state
statute. A number of lower courts simply take for
granted the fact that the substantial question inquiry
relates only to the jurisdiction of the three-judge court
and has nothing to do with federal jurisdiction. Na-
tional Mobilization Committee To End The War In
Viet Nam v. Foran, 297 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. fll. 1968),
O'Hair v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 815, 818 (D.D.C.
1968). In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970),
Mr. Justice Harlan referred to the .Poresky rationale as
"a maxim more ancient than analytically sound."
21 In Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein,
370 U.S. 713 (1962), the Court indicated that the sub-
stantial question requirement was a precondition to the
convening of a three-judge court. Since that decision,
the substantial question test has been consistently
followed in the lower courts.
2'See Currie, supra note 12 at 21; Bereuffy, The
Three-Judge Federal Court, 15 Roccyt MT. L. REv. 64,
71. Professor Currie indicates that the Bar Association
Committee which initiated the passage of the amend-
ment was of the opinion that it would overrule Poresky.
The amendment in its present form is 28 U.S.C.§ 2284(5) (1964). The sentence which was thought to
overrule Poresky provides in part: "A single judge
shall not.., dismiss the action, or enter a summary or
final judgement." The reasons the amendment did not
overrule Poresky are two: First, 28 U.S.C. § 2284,
In 1963, the Court further extended the sub-
stantial question doctrine in Bailey v. Patterson,"
holding that where prior decisions of the Supreme
Court make frivolous any claim to the constitu-
tionality of a state statute a single judge need not
convene a three-judge court. The Court in Bailey
refused to take an appeal from a three-judge court
on the ground that one judge instead of three
should have decided the case.U just as the Court in
Poresky held that a clearly constitutional state
statute did not raise a substantial constitutional
question and did not, therefore, merit a three-
judge hearing, so the Court in Bailey held that a
state statute which, in view of prior decisions, was
clearly unconstitutional also failed to raise a sub-
stantial constitutional question and should not be
brought before a three-judge court. While one
commentator has suggested the Bailey rationale
should be only applied to civil rights cases,'26
Bailey like Poresky has received subsequent
Supreme Court ratification.'1
The substantial question inquiry has put the
single judge in the curious position of deciding
whether a statute is clearly constitutional or clearly
unconstitutional before he can determine whether
he or a three-judge court has jurisdiction to hear
the case. To make this inquiry, the Poresky Court
offered the following definition of what it con-
sidered an unsubstantial question to be:
The question may be plainly unsubstantial, either
because it is obviously without merit or because its
unsoundness so clearly results from the previous
decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject
and leave no room for the inference that the ques-
tion sought to be raised can be the subject of con-
troversy.n
The characterization of a claim as "obviously
without merit" can hardly be viewed as a helpful
qualification of the meaning of "unsubstantial
which sets out the procedure for the convening of the
special court refers only to those actions "required" to
be heard by a three-judge court. Since an insubstantial
question is not required to be so heard under .Poresky,
the Amendment is not controlling. Second, the begin-
ning of part 5 of § 2284 refers to the actions of one of
the judges of the three-judge court, not to the original
district judge who convenes the court. The "singlejudge" referred to in the above sentence can be easily
construed to refer to one of the three judges and not
the district judge. See note 4 supra.
369 U.S. 31 (1962).
24 Id. at 33.
25 See Currie, supra note 12, at 65.
26 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Turner v.
City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
"290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933).
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question." Nor do "previous decisions" of the
Supreme Court provide a single judge with a
clear standard by which to convene a three-judge
court. Different factual situations, new constitu-
tional theories, and conflicting Supreme Court
rulings make such a determination difficult. As a
result, the substantial question inquiry depends
largely on the predilections of individual judges.
Two recent cases illustrate the variations which
exist between courts with respect to what the sub-
stantial question inquiry involves.
In National Mobilization Committee to End the
War in Viet Nain v. Foran,28 a district judge denied
a three-judge court hearing on the ground that
the celebrated Anti-Riot Act raised no substantial
constitutional question. In affirming the district
judge, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit found that a Supreme Court decision uphold-
ing an Arkansas disorderly conduct statute fore-
closed any constitutional question with respect to
the Anti-Riot Act.2 19 In fact, the two statutes were
arguably quite different in-as-much as the conduct
proscribed in the Anti-Riot Act went beyond the
scope of the activities proscribed by the Arkansas
statute upheld by the Supreme Court.10 The
Seventh Circuit, nonetheless, found the two stat-
utes sufficiently similar to preclude a three-judge
hearing. To reach such a conclusion the Seventh
Circuit implicitly gave the Anti-Riot Act a narrow
interpretation, and, in so doing, sanctioned the
right of district judges to interpret challenged
statutes in order to obviate their raising substan-
tial constitutional questions. Under such an inter-
pretation of the substantiality doctrine few three-
judge courts would be convened. For if a district
judge was unable to narrow a statute sufficiently to
avoid a constitutional challenge, he would either
(1) only convene a three-judge court when he him-
self thought it likely that the statute was uncon-
2 297 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. I1. 1968).
29 411 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969).
The Anti-Riot Act forbids persons from travelling
in interstate commerce "with intent" to incite or en-
courage a riot and performing "any... overt act" in
furtherance thereof. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1968). The
overt act to which the Anti-Riot Act refers could be a
telephone call or it could be rioting itself. The Arkansas
statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas required that a person actually take part in an
unlawful assemblage with the intention to resort to
force or violence in order to fall under the statute's
proscriptions. Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345, 348-49(1949). For this statute to foreclose a substantial con-
stitutional question with respect to the Anti-Riot Act
would require at the least that the "overt act" referred
to in the Anti-Riot Act be interpreted to encompass
presence at a riot.
stitutional or (2) enjoin the enforcement of the
state statute himself on the basis that it was
clearly unconstitutional.
The Fifth Circuit, which forms far more three-
judge courts than any other circuit," takes a more
liberal approach than the Seventh Circuit. In
Hargrave v. McKinney,n the court overruled the
decision of a district judge who found no substan-
tial question in a constitutional attack on a Florida
educational tax requirement. While the language
of the court of appeals would seem to indicate
scepticism on its part that the claim was particu-
larly meritorious, the court nevertheless felt obli-
gated to convene a three-judge court under its
interpretation of the substantiality definition
proposed in Poresky. The court held that a claim
need only be arguable to merit the invocation of a
three-judge court.
Regardless of our personal reactions to the merits
of plaintiffs' position and regardless of the novelty
of the theories which support their position, we can-
not say that their view of the taxing scheme is be-
yond challenge.. . . All we decide is that the claim
is such an arguable one as to be "substantial"
within the Poresky definition.n
2. Quasi-Jurisdictional Questions
The Poresky Court established that the sub-
stantial question inquiry must be made initially by
the single judge and not by the three-judge court.
This follows because the substantial question in-
quiry goes to the question of federal jurisdiction
itself, and the district judge must ascertain his
own jurisdiction before a three-judge court can be
convened. Therefore, the three-judge court cannot
in the first instance determine its own jurisdiction
with regard to the substantiality of plantiff's
claim because for it to do so would be to presup-
pose that federal jurisdiction exists.
s 'Of 215 Three-judge Courts convened in 1969, 57
were convened in the Fifth Circuit. (See 1969 Div.
Anum. Orr., U.S. CouRus, AN. REP. 135). The 5th
Circuit's approach to the substantial question doctrine
was well elucidated by Judge Brown in Jackson v.
Choate, 404 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1968):
In this day and time of dynamic expansion of
constitutional principles and their application to
new and sometimes unheard of situations it takesjudicial prescience of a Delphic order to say with
certainty that the attack is insubstantial. It is the
better course--certainly from an administrative
standpoint-to forego the doubts, constitute a
3-Judge Court, and allow that court to determine
initially this and the other issues.
Id. at 913.
3- 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969).
3 Id. at 328.
1971]
COMMENT
With respect to questions which might be called
quasi-jurisdictional, however, there is some con-
fusion over which of these two courts, the single-
judge or the three-judge court, should decide
such questions in the first instance. For example,
the three-judge court is classified as a court in
equity because of the kind of relief it provides.
As such, before a statutory court can decide a
question on the merits, plaintiff must have at-
tained "equity jurisdiction". This can occur only
if plaintiff has exhausted legal and administrative
remedies.U It is not certain, however, whether a
single judge should make such equitable jurisdic-
tional determinations before convening a three-
judge court or whether such determinations should
be left to the three-judge court itself. In Stratton
v. St. Louis S. W. Ry.,35 the Court implied that
questions concerning equitable jurisdiction were
not to be decided by a single judge. Similarly, in
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein,36 the
Court stated in dicta that if the complaint "at
least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief" U
the inquiry of the single judge with respect to
questions of equitable jurisdiction ends. Yet a
number of lower courts have either not interpreted
these cases as foreclosing their dismissing a com-
plaint on equitable grounds, or have simply dis-
regarded them s
Similar to questions of equitable jurisdiction is
the quasi-jurisdictional doctrine of abstention (re-
taining jurisdiction but waiting for state courts to
34The Court has recently invoked the doctrine of
equitable jurisdiction to remove numerous suits from
the federal forum, and from three-judge courts in par-
ticular. In Younger v. Harris, 39 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1971), the Court ruled that federal courts
should not entertain constitutional attacks on state
statutes brought by persons facing good faith state
prosecution for violation of such statutes. The Court
intimated that a federal court should intervene only
where a challenged statute was being used by state
officers to harass plaintiff, or a state statute was clearly
an unconstitutional abridgement of First Amendment
rights.
35 282 U.S. 10 (1930), the Stratton Court said that the
district judge should not have dismissed "for want of
equity." Id. at 13. Yet the lower court had denied peti-
tioner relief on the ground that the statute was constitu-
tional. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Emmerson, 27 F.2d 1005,
1009 (S.D. Ill. 1928). Professor Currie has referred to
Stratton as "mighty weak authority" for the proposition
that a single judge cannot dismiss on equitable grounds.
Currie, supra note 12, at 25.
36 370 U.S. 713 (1962).
7Id. at 715.
3 Duncombe v. State of New York, 267 F. Supp. 103
(S.D. N.Y. 1967); Rosso v. Puerto Rico, 226 F. Supp.
688 (D.P.R. 1964); Linehan v. Waterfront Commission,
116 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. N.Y. 1953); Priceman v. Dewey,
81 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. N.Y. 1949).
interpret a challenged statute).3 9 With respect to
that doctrine, the Supreme Court has been much
more explicit. In Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry Co.,40
the Court ruled that a district judge could not ab-
stain in a case where a three-judge court was other-
wise required. The Court reasoned that abstention
could have the effect of a grant4 ' of denial4 ' of in-
junctive relief by a district judge, and this was ex-
actly what the Court had interpreted the three-
judge provision to proscribe.4 ' At least one lower
court has stated, however, that a district court
can indeed abstain in proper circumstances."
If, as the substantiality doctrine would seem to
suggest, the Supreme Court follows a policy of
limiting three-judge court jurisdiction, it is curious
that the Court has not chosen to treat questions of
equity jurisdiction and abstention as threshold
prerequisites to the convening of a three-judge
court. The prospect of a single judge convening a
three-judge court only to have the special court
later dismiss itself for want of equity jurisdiction
strikes of wastefulness. Not only would the dis-
trict judge have had to determine the substantiality
of plaintiff's claim, but also the Supreme Court
would be bound to review the decision of the three-
judge court dismissing itself.45
3 The abstention doctrine was developed by the
Supreme Court in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941), in the interest of comity between
federal and state courts. Although after the Judiciary
Act of 1875 federal courts had the duty to respect plain-
tiff's right to the federal forum whenever his claim was
founded on a constitutional provision, the Court in
Pullman ruled that federal courts should defer to state
courts in special circumstances. Where, for example, a
state court construction of a challenged state statute
could avoid the constitutional issue raised by plaintiff,
the Court has held abstention to be the proper proce-
dure. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970). Simi-
larly, when state criminal proceedings have commenced
after plaintiff has filed his complaint in federal court,
the Court has held that federal courts should not inter-
fere with the state prosecution. Douglas v. City of
Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1942).
40282 U.S. 10 (1930), followed in Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 716
(1962).41 Where a temporary restraining order was in effect,
abstention would have the effect of a preliminary in-
junction.
42The Supreme Court has interpreted the Three-
Judge Act as not permitting a district judge to grant or
deny injunctive relief. See note 17 supra and accom-
panying text.
43 Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 17
(1970).
44 Duncombe v. State of New York, 267 F. Supp. 193
(S.D. N.Y. 1967). Such circumstances would be in the
face of an impending criminal prosecution.
45 See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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3. Alternative Statutory A ttacks
Another instance in which the discretionary
limits of the single judge are unclear is when a
claim is presented before a single judge which as-
serts alternative causes of action, one based on a
constitutional provision and the other on noncon-
stitutional (e.g., statutory) grounds. Although the
Supreme Court has consistently held that if the
constitutional claim is substantial a single judge
must convene a three-judge court to hear both
claims,46 a recent Supreme Court decision casts
considerable doubt on the necessity of a single
judge to do so.
In Rosado v. Wyman,0 Justice Harlan indicated
in dicta that where there are alternative causes of
action, one based on a constitutional argument
and the other based on statutory grounds:
... (T)he most appropriate course may well have
been to remand to the single district judge for find-
ings and the determination of the statutory claim
rather than encumber the District Court at a time
when district court calendars are over-burdened, by
consuming the time of three federal judges in a
matter that was not required to be determined by a
three-judge court.43
Justice Harlan would thus suggest that the three-
judge court and single-judge should have concur-
rent jurisdiction over the statutory claim. In sup-
port of this proposition, Justice Harlan inappro-
priately cited Swift & Co. v. Wickham.4 Unlike
Justice Harlan's hypothetical, Swift involved a
situation where plaintiff's constitutional claim
was held by the Supreme Court to not merit three-
judge adjudication." As a result, the Court stated
46Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73
(1970); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). Each of these
cases refer to alternative constitutional and non-consti-
tutional attacks on state statutes. Where a constitu-
tional attack on a state statute is presented with other
counts which are not directed against the statute, at
least one court has held that the counts of the complaint
should be split, allowing the constitutional question to
be determined by a three-judge court, and the non-
statutory attacks to be determined by the district judge.
See Smuck v. Hobsen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
47397 U.S. 397 (1970).
49 Id. at 403. Although Rosado itself involved a situa-
tion where the constitutional question raised by peti-
tioner became moot during the course of litigation,justice Harlan suggests that the single judge should
decide the statutory claim even when it is joined with a
substantial constitutional claim which is not moot. Id.
49 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
10 In Swift, the Court overruled its recent decision in
Kessler v. Dept. of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), in
which it had held that constitutional challenges invok-
ing the Supremacy Clause could be brought before a
three-judge court.
that the case could have been decided by a single
judge on all issues. Justice Harlan suggests, how-
ever, that even where the constitutional claim is a
viable one, the three-judge court should remand
the statutory claim to the single judge to be dis-
posed of by him. The Supreme Court has never so
held."
If accepted by lower courts, Justice Harlan's
proposal would further limit three-judge jurisdic-
tion. Like other such limitations of three-judge
power, the proposal would have the virtue of re-
ducing both three-judge courts and direct appeals
to the Supreme Court 2 With respect to its nega-
tive effects, the proposal would delay access to the
three-judge forum while the single judge was de-
ciding the statutory question. Further, the ar-
rangement would result in the curious situation of
plaintiff's claims being carried in two courts at the
same time. For example, if the district judge were
to dismiss the statutory claim, plaintiff would then
have to argue that claim in the court of appeals
while for the first time arguing his constitutionally-
based claim before a three-judge court. Moreover,
if the district judge decided to abstain from de-
ciding the statutory question until state remedies
were exhausted, his decision would have the effect
of foreclosing the dormant constitutional attack
and would fall under the proscriptions of Idlewild
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein."
4. State Statutes-Geographical Scope and Uncon-
stitutional Applications
If Section 2281 makes one thing clear, it is that
in order for a three-judge court to be convened
the unconstitutionality of a state statute must be
alleged. Although the originators of the Three-
Judge Act did not see fit to qualify what was meant
by a state statute, the Supreme Court did. Early
in the Court's interpretation of the Act, the Court
ruled that Congress intended the three-judge
provision to apply only to cases "of unusual
gravity". The Court reasoned that a three-judge
court need not be convened unless "a state statute
of general and statewide application is sought to
be enjoined". 5 The Court thus determined that a
state statute which affected only one area of a
51 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
r2 Where plaintiffs were granted relief on the statu-
tory claim by the district judge, there would be no need
to convene the three-judge court.53 See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 567 (1928).
Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 101 (1967).
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state was foreclosed from three-judge court ad-
judication.
The Court has offered a number of examples as
to what it considers a statute of local applica-
bility."6 In its most recent example, Moody v.
Flowers,57 the Court held that a state statute which
affected only one county of the state did not
necessitate a three-judge hearing. The Court was
not impressed with the fact that a majority of
counties in the state were governed by similar
statutes.Y In a companion case to Moody, how-
ever, the Court did find three judges were required
where a state statute applied to all counties. 59
Although the Court's distinction may have
lacked substance,6" it at least had the virtue of
being simple for a district judge to work with.
Two recent rulings, however, appear to have re-
turned the district judge to a state of uncertainty.
In Alabama State Teachers Association v. Public
School and College Authority,6 the Court affirmed
a decision of a three-judge court concerning an
Alabama statute which authorized a bond issue for
the construction of a local branch of Auburn Uni-
versity. And in Evans v. Cornman,2 the Court
affirmed the decision of a three-judge court which
dealt with an order by the Maryland Board of
Registry denying the right to vote to residents
living on the grounds of the National Institute of
Health. In neither case could it be said that the
geographical concern of the statute was state-
wide.
With respect to the jurisdiction of the three-
judge court to enjoin state statutes which are
being unconstitutionally applied but which are
constitutional on their face, the Supreme Court
56Rorick v. Board of Commissioners, 307 U.S. 208
(1939) (Florida statute applicable only to Everglade
Drainage District denied three judges); Ex parte Public
National Bank, 278 U.S. 101 (1928) (State statute
authorizing state tax assessment for the city of New
York denied a three-judge court); Ex part Collins, 277
U.S. 565 (1928) (statute permitting towns to assess
costs of street improvements denied three judges).
67387 U.S. 97, 101 (1967).
5s Id. at 102.
59 Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
60 The only distinction between Sailors v. Board of
Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), and Moody v. Flowers,
387 U.S. 97 (1967), is that in Moody the majority of
counties in the state were subject to similar but separate
statutes, while in Sailors each county was governed by
one statute. The effect of an injunction in both cases
would have substantially the same effect. It would be a
rare state officer who would pursue the same policy in
one county which he had been enjoined from pursuing
in another.
61393 U.S. 400 (1969).
- 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
has been equally ambiguous. In Turner v. Fouche,0
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a three-
judge court which held a Georgia statute consti-
tutional on its face but unconstitutional in its ap-
plication. The three-judge court had granted in-
junctive relief with respect to the unconstitutional
manner in which the statute was being carried out.
In affirming, the Supreme Court stated that three-
judge courts could properly fashion remedies which
proscribed constitutional conduct without in-
validating a statute which could be carried out
constitutionally. 1
Although the Turner decision followed a number
of Supreme Court rulings which permitted three-
judge courts to enjoin the unconstitutional en-
forcement of state statutes,6" the jurisdiction of
three-judge courts to entertain such constitutional
challenges is not as simple as the Turner court
would indicate. In a footnote in Turner, the Court
states:
The appellees also propose a distinction between
attacks on statutes and attacks upon the results of
their administration, and urge that the appellant's
case comes within the latter category. But this
argument overlooks the line, delineated by our past
decisions, that falls between a petition for injunc-
tion on the ground of the unconstitutionality of a
statute, either on its face or as applied, which re-
quires a three-judge court, and a petition seeking
an injunction upon the unconstitutionality of the
result obtained by the use of a statute not attacked
as unconstitutional. 66
The Court's distinction between "unconstitu-
tional applications" and "unconstitutional results"
stems from two earlier Supreme Court rulings. In
Ex parte Bransford6 and Phillipps v. United States, s
the Court ruled that where a state officer acted
outside the scope of his statutory authority in
seeking to enforce a state statute, the case was not
one for a three-judge court because the "action
complained of" was not "directly attributable to
the statute". 9 The Court reasoned that the un-
authorized activities of the state officers in each
case in no way affected the validity of the state
statutes which they were improperly enforcing.
Whatever the theoretical niceties, the distinction
63 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
64 Id. at 355.
65 Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 102-104 (1947);
Query v. United States, 316 U.S. 486,489 (1942).
6396 U.S. 346, 353 n. 10 (1970).
' 310 U.S. 354 (1940).
6 312 U.S. 246 (1941).69 Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 361 (1940).
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espoused by the Supreme Court does not lend it-
self easily to practical application. In order to
determine whether or not a three-judge court
should be convened, a district judge must make a
difficult inquiry into the legislative history of a
particular statute in order to determine whether
or not the challenged means by which the statute
is being carried out was intended by the legisla-
ture. The difficulty in making such inquiries is ef-
fectively illustrated by two cases where courts at-
tempted to apply the distinction developed from
Bransford and Phillipps. In Tyrone, Inc., v. Wil-
kinson,70 police seized a film under a state ob-
scenity statute without first affording the owner a
prior hearing to determine whether or not the film
was in fact obscene. The district court having
ruled in favor of the film owner, the state's at-
torney argued on appeal that petitioner's attack
on the constitutionality of the seizure was an at-
tack on the state's search and seizure statute and
a three-judge court should have, therefore, been
convened.7 The Fourth Circuit dismissed the
state's argument and refused to convene a three-
judge court on the ground that the challenged
activity was the result of the improper enforce-
ment of a valid state statute. In a similar factual
situation, the Second Circuit in Astro Cinema Corp.
v. MackelP2 ruled that the challenged police ac-
tivities were within the scope of the search and
seizure state and a three-judge court should have
been convened. In reaching opposite conclusions on
the basis of similar facts, the Fourth Circuit cited
Philhipps v. United States" and the Second Circuit
cited Fx parte Bransford 4
In summary, the Supreme Court has imposed
numerous conditions on district judges which are
prerequisite to the convening of a three-judge
court. Although the Supreme Court cannot be
criticized for inaugurating those standards, it can
be criticized for the lack of clarity and uniformity
those standards provide. The result of the use of
these standards by district courts is to force
litigants to take expensive and time-consuming
appeals to the court of appeals on the threshold
question of three-judge court jurisdiction. To the
extent that such appeals effectively deny litigants
access to the three-judge forum, the purposes of
the Three-judge Act are compromised.
70 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969).
71 Id. at 643.
422 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970).
73410 F.2d 639, 643 (4th Cir. 1969).
74 422 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1970).
B. Appellate Review
Because of the number and complexity of thresh-
old determinations which both one-judge and three-
judge courts must make with respect to three-
judge court jurisdiction, an efficient means of re-
viewing those determinations is imperative if the
goals of the Three-Judge Act are to be realized.
Unfortunately, the appellate structure associated
with three-judge courts can hardly be described as
efficient 5 The Three-judge Act itself did not
provide for review of questions relating to three-
judge jurisdiction, and although the Supreme Court
can be credited for recently making efforts to
create a more orderly system of appeal,76 the
present appellate system associated with the
three-judge court is wholly inadequate. The sys-
tem both exerts a strain on judicial resources, and
ties litigants up in costly and time-consuming
appeals on threshold questions.
Where a district judge refuses to convene a
three-judge court for any reason, the Supreme
Court has recently indicated that review of that
decision lies in the court of appeals7 7 In reaching
75 Some commentators have referred to the three-
judge court appellate structure as "so complex as to be
virtually beyond belief." C. WRIGHT, Tim LAW or
FEDERAL CouRTs § 50, at 193 (1970).76See, e.g., Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Com-
mission, 393 U.S. 83 (1968); Wilson v. City of Port
Lavaca, 391 U.S. 352 (1968); Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962).
17 Where a district judge has refused to convene a
three-judge court for want of federal jurisdiction, the
court of appeals has always been the proper place to
review that decision. Eastern States Petroleum Corp. v.
Rogers, 265 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1959), appeal dismissed,
Eastern States Petroleum Corp. v. Prettyman, 361 U.S.
805 (1959); Carrigan v. Sunland-Tujunga Telephone
Co., 263 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
975 (1959); White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 973 (1958). Where a single
judge has granted federal jurisdiction and decided a
case on the merits which a three-judge court should
have heard, the court of appeals has refused to review
his decision either on the merits or on his decision not
to convene a three-judge court. Idlewild Bon Voyage
Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426 (2nd Cir. 1961); Wicks v.
Southern Pacific Co., 231 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 946 (1956). Although it would seem
obvious that if a district judge had jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether or not a three-judge court should be con-
vened the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review
that decision, the Supreme Court in Stratton v. St. Louis
S.W. Ry. ruled that where a single judge inappro-
priately decided a case which should have been decided
by a three-judge court, review could not be had in the
court of appeals of the single judge's decision. 282 U.S.
10, 16 (1930). It was not until Idlewild Boan Voyage
Corp. v. Epstein that the Supreme Court indicated that
Stratton only meant that a court of appeals could not
review the single judge's decision on the merits. It did
not limit the court of appeals from reviewing the deci-
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this doctrine, the Court found it necessary to speak
through two decisions-each handed down within
four years of the other. In Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, the Court strongly im-
plied that all questions of three-judge court juris-
diction are reviewable in the court of appeals,n8
and in Schackman v. Arnebergh, the Court turned
this implication into fact, citing Idlawild as au-
thority for the proposition that review can indeed
be had in the court of appealsY9
Similarly, when a single judge grants a three-
judge hearing either correctly or incorrectly and
the three-judge court dissolves itself for want of
statutory jurisdiction, the Supreme Court seems
to have recently made the proper place of review
of that action the court of appeals. In both Wilson
v. City of Port Lavaca80 and Mengelkoch v. Industrial
Welfare Commission, " the Court found that the
decision of a three-judge court dismissing itself
on jurisdictional grounds was comparable to the
denial of a three-judge court by a single judge, and
was thus appealable in the court of appeals.
Unfortunately, however, the right to take an
appeal from the decision of the three-judge court
sion of the single judge not to convene a three-judge
court. 370 U.S. 713, 716 (1962).
78 370 U.S. 713 (1962).
79 387 U.S. 427 (1967). According to Judge Friendly:
If a court of appeals does not exactly havejurisdiction of an appeal in a case such as this, it
has something sufficiently similar to enable it to
reverse for the convening of a three-judge court.
Gold v. Lomenzo, 425 F.2d 959, 961 (2d Cir. 1970).
80 391 U.S. 352 (1968) (mem). In Wilson v. City of
Port Lavaca, 285 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Tex. 1968), the
three-judge court inappropriately entered its decision
as a final judgement and the district judge adopted that
opinion as his own. Id. at 88. Once the three-judge
court found itself without jurisdiction to decide the case,
it should have dissolved itself immediately. Professor
Currie would appear to criticize the Supreme Court for
ignoring "the once relevant fact that the three-judge
court had rendered a final decision." Currie, supra note
71, at 163. Yet the Supreme Court has never taken an
appeal from a three-judge court which lacked jurisdic-
tion to decide the case. See note 84 infra and accom-
panying text. Judge Brown, the circuit member of the
Wilson panel, has suggested that when the three-judge
court lacks jurisdiction it should adopt the opinion of
the district judge as its own in the event that the court
of appeals or Supreme Court subsequently finds that
the case was one for three-judges. Both higher courts
would simply treat the single judge decision as a three-judge decision, and permit an appeal to be taken to the
Supreme Court. Jackson v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910, 913
(5th Cir. 1968). It is quite likely that this was what was
intended in Wilson. The error the court made was tech-
nical. Instead of having the district judge adopt the
three-judge opinion as his own, the three-judge court
should have adopted the decision of the single judge as
its own.
81393 U.S. 83 (1968) (mem).
dissolving itself for want of jurisdiction is not as
simple as the Supreme Court indicates. When a
three-judge court dissolves itself on jurisdictional
grounds, it has not rendered a final decision from
which an appeal can be taken to the court of ap-
peals.s The special court has merely transferred
the case to the single judge to be decided by him
on the merits. Professor Currie points out that in
Mengelkoch the single judge rendered a final deci-
sion on the merits on the same day the three-judge
court dissolved itself for want of jurisdiction, and
it was the decision of the single judge, not the three-
judge court, which was actually appealed from in
the court of appeals.P While such an interpretation
of the Mengelkoch decision is quite plausible, the
Mengelkoch Court nevertheless offered strong
language to the effect that it was the interlocutory
order of the three-judge court dissolving itself
which could be appealed to the court of appeals."
8 Presumably, appeals from the district court to the
Court of appeals can only be taken from final decisions
of the district court. J. MooR, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
RULEs PAMPBHIT 906 (1970). Where a three-judge
court dissolves itself for want of federal jurisdiction,
appeal of that decision may be taken to the court of ap-
peals because plaintiff's claim has been foreclosed from
further adjudication. Where, however, a three-judge
court found that it did not have the power to decide a
case, but that a single judge did, plaintiff has not been
put out of court by the three-judge decision. The deci-
sion of the three-judge court dissolving itself might be
compared to a change of venue. Plaintiff has simply
been transferred from one district court to another.
Similarly, when a single judge grants federal jurisdic-
tion, denies plaintiff a three-judge hearing, and goes on
to rule on the merits of plaintiff's claim, his initial deci-
sion denying a three-judge forum cannot be appealed
until he has rendered a final decision on the merits. In
fact, not until quite recently was even a final decision of
the single judge appealable in the court of appeals. See,
supra note 75 and accompanying text.
1 Currie, Appelate Review of the Decision Whether or
Not to Empanel a Three-Judge Federal Court, 37 U. Cm.
L. REv. 159, 163-64 (1969). Professor Currie would
advocate that mandamus be sought in the court of ap-
peals to compel the convening of a three-judge court
where (1) a three-judge court dissolves itself for want
of statutory jurisdiction and leaves the case to the
single judge to be decided on the merits, and (2) a singlejudge refuses to convene a three-judge court and retainsjurisdiction to decide the case on the merits. Id. at 164.84 The Court indicated in a footnote in Mengdkoch
that it was not important whether or not the single
judge adopted the opinion of the three-judge court as
his own for an appeal to be taken to the court of appeals.
393 U.S. 83, 84 (1968) (mem). The Court would imply
that an appeal could therefore be taken from "the deci-
sion" of the three-judge court. Since, however, a three-judge court does not have jurisdiction to render a final
decision where it finds that a case should be heard by a
single judge, the Court in Mengelkoch must have been
referring to the decision of the three-judge court to dis-
band for want of jurisdiction as the decision from which
an appeal can be taken.
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The Tenth Circuit has recently interpreted the
Mengelkocl decision in such a fashion and reviewed
an interlocutory order of a three-judge court.85
If the Mengelkock Court did intend that an ap-
peal can be taken from the decision of the three-
judge court dissolving itself, litigants would be
spared the possibility of trying a case before a
district judge only to have the decision of the dis-
trict judge voided if the court of appeals subse-
quently finds that the three-judge court was prop-
erly convened to begin with. Such a holding, how-
ever, would seem questionable in light of the fact
that the same situation exists when a single judge
refuses to convene a three-judge court and subse-
quently decides a case on the merits. The Supreme
Court has never intimated that the preliminary
decision of the single judge denying petitioners a
three-judge hearing can be immediately appealed.
Although it is now clear in most cases where to
appeal one-judge and three-judge decisions on the
question of three-judge court jurisdiction, the
appellate mechanism associated with such review
is far from adequate.86 When a single judge con-
86 Petuskey v. Rampton, 431 F.2d 378, 382 (10th Cir.
1970).
86The following charts in the text illustrate the num-
ber of courts through which litigants might pass in
seeking to gain access to the three-judge forum. The
charts are based on the premise that federal subject
matter jurisdiction exists. Where a case is, therefore,
not one for a three-judge court, it is one for a singlejudge. The decisions from which appeals are taken are
those concerning questions as to whether or not a three-judge court should be convened (except where an appeal
is taken from a final decision of a three-judge court).
The charts further assume that appeals are not taken
from the decision of the three-judge court dissolving
itself.
8 The analysis of the chart is as follows:
(1) A district judge correctly convenes a three-judge
court. The court agrees that it should be convened and
decides the merits of the case. The Supreme Court
venes a three-judge court, a litigant might pass
through as many as eight courts before his claim
is finally decided on the merits because of misin-
terpretations of as few as one statutory prerequi-
acknowledges jurisdiction, and reviews the three-judge
court's decision. Each court correctly decided that
three-judge court jurisdiction existed.(2) A district judge convenes a three-judge court
which incorrectly dismisses itself for want of jurisdic-
tion. The case is remanded to the single judge to rule on
the merits of the claim. The court of appeals reviews the
decision of the single judge on the merits, incorrectly
agreeing that the case was not one for three judges. The
Supreme Court grants certiorari, voids the decisions of
the court of appeals and district judge on the ground
that a three-judge court should have been convened,
and remands the case to the district judge to convene a
three-judge court. The three-judge court rules on the
merits of the claim, and the Supreme Court acknowl-
edges jurisdiction and reviews that decision.
(3) A district judge convenes a three-judge court
which incorrectly dismisses itself for want of jurisdic-
tion. The case is remanded to the single judge to rule
on the merits of the claim. The court of appeals voids
the decision of the single judge on the ground that a
three-judge court should have been convened, and
remands the case to him to convene a three-judge court.
The three-judge court is reconvened, and its decision is
reviewed by the Supreme Court.
(4) A district judge incorrectly convenes a three-judge court, which incorrectly decides the case on the
merits. A dual appeal is filed in the Supreme Court and
court of appeals by the losing party. Upon the Supreme
Court's refusal to accept jurisdiction on the ground that
the three-judge court should not have been convened,
the court of appeals grants jurisdiction to review the
decision of the three-judge court on the merits.
(5) A district judge convenes a three-judge court
which correctly dismisses itself for want of jurisdiction.
The single judge decides the case on the merits and the
court of appeals reviews that decision.(6) A district judge convenes a three-judge court
which correctly dismisses itself. The single judge decides
the case on the merits. On appeal, the court of appeals
incorrectly voids the judgment of the single judge be-
lieving the case to be one for a three-judge court and
remands the case to the district judge to convene a
three-judge court. The three-judge court decides the
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site to three-judge jurisdiction. This might occur
for example where a single judge correctly convenes
a three-judge court which incorrectly dissolves it-
self for want of statutory jurisdiction. The single
judge must then decide the case on the merits, and
a timely appeal of his decision may be taken to the
court of appeals. If the court of appeals fails to
rectify the original error of the three-judge court
case on the merits. A dual appeal is taken to the Su-
preme Court and the court of appeals. The Supreme
Court denies jurisdiction on the ground that a three-judge court should not have been convened. The court
of appeals reviews the decision of the three-judge court
on the merits.
88 (1) A district judge refuses to convene a three-judge court and decides the case on the merits (his
original decision not to convene the three-judge court is
non-appealable). The court of appeals improperly re-
views the decision of the district judge on the merits.
The Supreme Court grants certiorari, voids the decision
of the district court and court of appeals on the ground
that the case was one for three judges, and remands the
case to the district judge to convene a three-judge
court. The three-judge court decides the case on the
merits, and the Supreme Court reviews that decision on
appeal.(2) A single judge refuses to convene a three-judge
court and decides the case on the merits (his original
decision not to convene the three-judge court is non-
appealable). The court of appeals correctly voids his
decision, and remands the case to him to convene a
three-judge court. The three-judge court decides the
case on the merits, and review is had in the Supreme
Court.(3) The district judge correctly denies a three-judge
court and decides the case on the merits. The court of
appeals reviews his decision on appeal.(4) The district judge denies a three-judge court and
decides the case on the merits. On appeal, the court of
appeals incorrectly voids the judgment of the districtjudge and remands the case to him to form a three-judge court. The three-judge court decides the merits
of the case, and a dual appeal is filed to the Supreme
Court and the court of appeals. The Supreme Court
finds that the three-judge court should not have been
convened. The court of appeals then acknowledgesjurisdiction to review the decision of the three-judge
court on the merits.
dissolving itself, the Supreme Court must grant
certiorari, void the judgements of both the court
of appeals and the single judge, and remand the
case to the single judge to reconvene a three-judge
court. Upon an order of the three-judge court
either granting or denying injunctive relief, re-
view on the merits may at last be had in the Su-
preme Court. Similarly, when a single judge re-
fuses to convene a three-judge court, a litigant
might pass through six courts before his claim is
adjudicated on the merits and his last appeal is
taken. In fact, whenever a three-judge court or
single judge makes an error with respect to just
one of the prerequisite standards to three-judge
court jurisdiction, a litigant will on the averagehave
to pass through five courts. 9
Once a fortunate litigant has gained access to
the three-judge forum, he may find that appeal of
that tribunal's judgement was not as assured as
he might have imagined. As has been pointed out
above, if the three-judge court decides to dissolve
itself for lack of jurisdiction, appeal of that action
lies to the court of appeals and not the Supreme
Court. 90 But what of the situation where the three-
judge court decides a case on the merits after it
incorrectly decided that it was properly convened.
Should appeal of that decision be taken to the
Supreme Court or the court of appeals? While at
least one circuit court has insisted that the Supreme
Court must take the appeal, 91 the Court in Public
89 See notes 87 and 88 supra and accompanying text.
0' See notes 76-78 s=pra and accompanying text.91 According to Judge Brown, even where a three-
judge court lacked jurisdiction:
It is clear that a judicial review of the merits is not
within the power of the court of appeals and that
its role is narrowly limited to testing a denial of
three-judge status.
Mayhue's Super Liquor Store, Inc. v. Mieklejohn, 426
F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Service Comm. v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc.'
held that when three-judges ruled on a question
which one judge should have decided, an appeal of
the merits of that decision should be treated as a
single-judge decision and taken to the court of
appeals.
Nor is it certain that a decision by a properly
convened three-judge court will necessarily obtain
review in the Supreme Court. Although the Su-
preme Court is bound by statute to review an order
by a three-judge court granting or denying an in-
terlocutory or permanent injunction," the Court in
Goldstein v. Cox14 declined to review an order of a
three-judge court denying plaintiff summary judg-
ment. The three-judge court had ruled in effect
that the challenged statute was not unconstitu-
tional on its face.' 5 The Supreme Court stated
that only where plaintiff specifically requests a
preliminary injunction along with his motion for
summary judgement is the Supreme Court bound
to review the order of the three-judge court.9 6
Similarly, in Mitchell v. Donovan," the Court re-
fused to review a decision of a three-judge court
in which a declaratory judgement had been
granted but where the injunctive relief remedy was
considered moot. The Court held that the three-
judge decision was not one which granted or
denied an interlocutory or permanent injunction,
and appeal, therefore, should be taken to the court
of appeals."8
In all other cases, the Supreme Court will review
a final decision of a properly convened three-judge
court whether or not the decision goes to the merits
of the constitutional claim. In Zwickler v. Koota,9"
the Court accepted jurisdiction of a case in which
a three-judge court had abstained from deciding
the constitutional issue. And in Natural Gas &
"312 U.S. 621 (1941). This approach was followed in
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962), and Turner v.
City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962). In Turner, to
avoid wasting time, the Court treated the appeal from
the three-judge court as a writ of certiorari and decided
the case on the merits. 369 U.S. 353-354.
"See note 5 supra.
396 U.S. 471 (1970).
15 Goldstein v. Cox, 299 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. N.Y.
1968).
"1 Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 478-79 (1970).
398 U.S. 427 (1970). But see Gunn v. University
Committee to End tIe War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383
(1970), where the Supreme Court refused to review a
decision of a three-judge court to stay its mandate
granting injunctive relief pending the next session of
the Texas legislature.
s 398 U.S. at 430.
9389 U.S. 241 (1967).
Pipeline Co. v. Slattery,'' the Court reviewed a
decision of a three-judge court which denied the
requested relief on the ground that administrative
remedies had not been exhausted.
III. Two ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT
THREE-JuDGE CouRT SYsTir
In light of the procedural difficulties which fed-
eral judges and litigants alike must face in coping
with Section 2281, it is doubtful that the benefits
to be gained from the three-judge forum surpass
the expenses incurred.10' There are two approaches
which might be taken to solve the present pro-
cedural difficulties. One would be for the Supreme
Court to clarify each of the standards it has beset
on district courts with respect to when a three-
judge court should be convened. Such a solution
would require a Herculean effort by the Court,
and this is not to be counted on. A more plausible
solution would be to simplify the appellate struc-
ture associated with three-judge courts such that
the various determinations involving three-judge
court jurisdiction would no longer trigger the com-
plex chain of appeals which they do now. This sec-
tion will look to two means by which the three-
judge appellate structure might be simplified.
The first will assume the retention of Section 2281,
while the second will be founded on its abrogation.
If Section 2281 were not to be abolished, one
method to prune many of the inefficiencies which
now exist is that suggested by Chief Judge Brown
of the Fifth Circuit. In Jackson v. Choate, "2 Judge
Brown proposed that the roles of the single-judge
and three-judge court be merged into one. The role
of the single-judge would be limited to ascertaining
whether the complaint requested an injunction
against the enforcement of a state statute alleged
to violate the Federal Constitution. The three-
judge court would deal with all threshold questions
with respect to its own jurisdiction."31 In the event
that the three-judge court found that it lacked
jurisdiction to decide a case and left the case to be
100302 U.S. 300 (1937). But see Wilson v. City of
Port Lavaca, 391 U.S. 352 (1968), where an argument
could be made that a decision by a three-judge court to
deny relief on equitable grounds is appealable to the
court of appeals. In that case, however, the three-judge
court ruled that it had not been correctly convened.
Wilson v. City of Port Lavaca, 285 F. Supp. 85,87 (S.D.
Tex. 1968). See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
101 Chief justice Burger recently questioned the need
for the three-judge court in his State of the judiciary
Message. Burger, The State of the Judiciary, 1970, 56
A.B.A.J. 929, 933 (1970).
"02404 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1969).
10' Id. at 913.
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decided by a single judge, Judge Brown would
advocate that the remaining two members of the
panel join in the merits decision of the single
judge.104 In that way, if the court of appeals or
Supreme Court subsequently overruled the deci-
sion of the three-judge court dismissing itself, the
decision of the single judge on the merits could be
treated as a three-judge court decision and appeal
could be taken directly to the Supreme Court.105
One of the problems involved with these sug-
gestions is that a great many more three-judge
courts could be convened than at present. While
this may be true, the argument that three-judge
courts put a strain on judicial resources is generally
overstated. In 1969, approximately 151 three-
judge courts were formed pursuant to Sections
2281 and 2282.106 Even if this figure were doubled
it would seem but a small thorn in the side of dis-
trict judges who in 1969 disposed of 103,932
cases. 107 This is particularly true in view of the
fact that three-judge cases generally do not in-
volve factual controversies and can be disposed of
on the basis of the complaint l s
Another difficulty with the Brown approach is
that litigants are denied the deliberation of three
judges whenever the three-judge court joins in the
opinion of the single judge and the court of appeals
subsequently finds that the case should have been
decided by a three-judge court. Although appeal
could be taken directly to the Supreme Court from
the decision of the single judge due to the concur-
rence of the other two members of the original
104 Id.
105 The court of appeals would remand the case to the
district judge who would enter a fresh decree, this time
with a three-judge stamp. From that decree direct ap-
peal could be taken to the court of appeals. As an alter-
native to having the three-judge court join in the opin-
ion of the single judge, it would be even simpler to cloak
the court of appeals with three-judge authority when a
case comes up which should have been tried by the
three-judge court. This, too, would avoid the necessity
of reconvening the special court, and the absurdity of
one three-judge court overruling another three-judge
court in order to form a third three-judge court. This
would, however, involve a statutory change.
106There were 215 final decisions of three-judge
courts in 1969. Of these, 81 were civil rights cases, 69
involved state regulations in general, 1 involved reap-
portionment, and 64 involved orders of the I.C.C. The
cases in the first three categories would fall under Sec-
tions 2281 and 2282. See 1969 Div. ADmi. Orr., U.S.
CouRns ANN. xEP. 135.
107 Id. at 49. There were 73,354 civil cases and 30,578
criminal cases disposed of in the district courts in 1969.
108 Jackson v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir.
1968).
three-judge panel, findings of fact and conclusions
of law will, nonetheless, be by one judge instead of
three. While it is clear that the other two members
of the panel would not join in the opinion of the
district judge unless they fully agreed with him,
the element of deliberation between three judges
would still be lacking.
Notwithstanding these difficulties; the proce-
dural benefits from the Brown approach would be
numerous. No longer would single judges incor-
rectly enjoin state activities, or deny plaintiff his
day in court because of frequent appeals on the
threshold question of three-judge court jurisdiction.
The various criteria which the Supreme Court has
imposed on the single judge with respect to the
impaneling of a three-judge court would become
the burden of the special court itself. Although the
lack of clarity inherent in these standards would
still exist, they would no longer set off the complex
appellate mechanism which they do now.
A far simpler alternative than that offered by
Judge Brown would be to repeal Section 2281 and
in its place grant an expedited appeal to the court
of appeals on the same criteria which exist now in
deciding whether or not to convene a three-judge
court.109 Whenever a single judge found the case
to be one for special appellate review, the court of
appeals would simply give the appealnO special
preference on its docket. If there were any triable
issues of fact involved, the single judge could act
as a master in chancery, or fact finder for the court
of appeals without ruling on the merits. Where the
single judge thought the case not to be one for
special appellate review, he could simply treat the
case as one for one judge determination and cor-
rectly or incorrectly rule on the merits. If he in-
correctly ruled on a case which should have been
designated for special review, the court of appeals
would simply ignore his decision and rule on the
merits of the case as if it had come up the correct
way. Whether the single judge was right or wrong
:10 See Comment, The Three-Judge Court Reassessed:
Changing Roles in Federal-State Relationships, 72 YAiz
L. J. 1646, 1653, where the possibility of an expedited
appeal was considered but rejected.
no The term "appeal" is used in the figurative sense.
The court of appeals would have original jurisdiction
over any merits decision of a special review case. There
would thus be no final dicision of a single judge from
which an appeal could be taken. When a single judge
found a case to be one for special review, he would
notify the chief judge of the circuit who would in turn
give the case special preference on the circuit court's
docket.
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on either threshold or merits questions, the court
of appeals could decide on all questions before it."
If Congress so desired, direct review to the Su-
preme Court of special review cases could be in-
corporated as a feature of the system. While there
can be no doubt that the Supreme Court finds
direct appeal from three-judge decisions an imposi-
tion,"' the relief the Supreme Court would receive
by transferring three-judge appeals to the courts
of appeals is dubious. First, under Section 1254(2)
which permits direct appeal to the Supreme Court
from decisions of courts of appeal rendering state
statutes unconstitutional, n ' the Court would re-
ceive many of the same appeals it would have re-
ceived from three-judge decisions. Second, it must
be supposed that the Court would grant certiorari
in many former three-judge cases in which a
declaratory judgment did not issue from the court
rathe only procedural delay a litigant might en-
counter under the special review approach would be
where a single judge inappropriately decided a special
review case on the merits. In lieu of immediate review
in the court of appeals, litigants would be obliged to
take a timely appeal to the court of appeals. Such an
appeal would engender a delay of only a few months.
Compared with the delay and procedural confusion
which now exists when a single judge makes such an
error, this would hardly seem to cause litigants irre-
parable injury.
m U.S. v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.1(1963).
1, 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) provides in part:
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court by the following methods:
(2) By appeal by a party relying on a state
statute held by a court of appeals to be invalid
as repugnant to the Constitution....
of appeals. Third, speedy access to the Supreme
Court is perhaps the most important feature of the
three-judge court system and is of itself a sufficient
reason for maintaining direct appeal.U4
The special review procedure would maintain all
the benefits of the three-judge court system with
almost none of the costs. The three circuit judges
could be seen as forming an even more august body
than the former special court of two district judges
and one circuit judge. The entire appellate morass
associated with the three-judge court would be
eliminated, and speedy access to the Supreme
Court could be easily provided for by Congress in
special review cases. The extra strain on the court
of appeals of approximately 150 cases which they
would not have normally heard is a small price to
pay considering circuit judges are presently re-
quired in three-judge cases, and appeals of thresh-
old questions concerning three-judge court juris-
diction would no longer exist.
114 Alternatively, Congress might simply provide for
direct review in the Supreme Court of former three-judge court cases by means of existing statutory meas-
ures which provide for direct review from decisions of
the court of appeals. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), any
decision of the court of appeals which renders a state
statute unconstitutional can be appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. Thus, in any former three-judge court
case in which a statute was declared unconstitutional
on its face, direct review would be available. Reliance
on this provision would, however, remove a large num-
ber of former three-judge court cases from the direct
review advantages they once had. These would include(1) those cases in which plaintiff was denied injunctive
relief and (2) those cases in which the unconstitutional
enforcement of a statute was enjoined without the
statute itself being struck down.
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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
MIRANDA PROBLEMS
In Harris v. New York, __ U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 643
(1971) the Supreme Court restricted the applica-
bility of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Speaking for a five-man majority, Chief Justice
Burger held that a defendant's statement could be
used to impeach his credibility, even though such a
statement would be inadmissible under Miranda
to establish the case in chief. During cross examina-
tion the prosecution used questions and answers
from a partially inconsistent prior statement to
impeach defendant Harris' testimony that he had
not sold heroin. "The trial judge instructed the
jury that the statements attributed to petitioner
by the prosecution could be considered only in
passing on petitioner's credibility and not as
evidence of guilt." 1
The Court recognized that this result was con-
trary to "some comments in the Miranda opinion,"
but considered that language to be dictum and thus
not controlling 2 Instead it relied on Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), where the Court
permitted otherwise inadmissible evidence to be
used for impeachment purposes. Unlike that of
Harris, however, Walder's impeachment concerned
a collateral matter.3 The Court admitted the dis-
1 -U.S. at _, 91 S. Ct. at 644.
2 Id. at - Although unspecified, the Court appar-
ently referred to this language:
In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpa-
tory by the defendant are often used to impeach
his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths
in the statement given under interrogation and
thus to prove guilt by implication. These state-
ments are incriminating in any meaningful sense of
the word and may not be used without the full
warnings and effective waiver required for any
other statement. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 477 (1966).
3 The facts of that case differ considerably from
Harris. Walder was arrested on a narcotics charge in
1950, but the case was dismissed after illegally seized
evidence had been suppressed. In 1952 he was again ar-
rested on a narcotics charge. In the trial of the second
case, he denied that he ever purchased, sold or possessed
narcotics. The prosecution impeached his testimony by
introducing evidence that in 1950 he had in fact pos-
sessed narcotics, as he had admitted at the time in an
affidavit filed in the suppression hearing. The Court
characterized this as collateral and added:
Of his own accord, the defendant went beyond a
mere denial of complicity in the crimes of which
he was charged and made the sweeping claim that
he had never dealt in or possessed narcotics. Of
course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant
similarity, but extended the Walder principle for a
variety of reasons, including the following: (1)
impeachment is valuable for assessing credibility;
(2) there is only "speculative possibility" that
limited use of illegal statements will encourage
police misconduct; (3) the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule is sufficiently served by limiting
inadmissibility of illegal statements to the case
in chief; (4) a person testifying has the duty to
speak truthfully and thus may be subjected to
"the traditional truth-testing devices of the ad-
versary process;" and (5) Miranda should not be-
come "a license to use perjury by way of a de-
fense." 4
The Court's approach to this case restricts
Miranda in several respects. First, the Court finds
the rule of Miranda inapplicable in a Harris-type
situation, treating the language used in applying
the Miranda principle to such instances as mere
dictum.' Second, the Court seems to discard the
premise of Miranda "that without proper safe-
guards" the interrogation process "contains in-
herently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not do so
freely." 6 In other words, the Court seems to reject
the idea that absence of a complete Miranda
warning creates an inherently coercive situation.
There is a marked contrast in Harris, where the
Court concedes the statement would be inadmis-
sible to prove the case in chief because a complete
Miranda wanning was absent, but also points out
that there was no claim of coercion or involun-
tariness.7 In terms of Miranda, such a claim would
be unnecessary, for absence of the warning is
equated with coercion. In this respect, a departure
from the Miranda rationale is apparent. Finally, it
implicitly rejects the view that such a statement
tends to prove "guilt by implication" even if use is
the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation
against him. He must be free to deny all the ele-
ments of the case against him without thereby giv-
ing leave to the government to introduce by way
of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and
therefore not available for its case in chief. Walder
v. United States 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
4 _ U.S. at _, 91 S. Ct. at 646.6See supra note 2.
6 384 U.S. at 467.
7_ U.S. at , 91 S. Ct. at 645.
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supposedly confined to impeachment. Although
these restrictions seem apparent, it is unclear how
narrowly the Supreme Court will come to read
Miranda.
Two California decisions indicate a further
restriction of the Miranda principle. The court
in People v. Thomas, 12 Cal. 3d 1102, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1970), held that no Miranda warn-
ing was required prior to search without a
warrant where the defendant consented to the
search. The court's ruling resulted despite its
finding that Thomas was "in custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action," and thus in a
situation which would seemingly require that a
complete Miranda warning precede any statement
elicited from him.8 The court instead avoided the
impact of Miranda by deciding: "A consent to
search, as such, is neither testimonial, nor com-
municative in the Fifth Amendment sense," 9 i.e.
consent to search is not a "statement," although
the effect may be just as damning.
In People v. Houle, 13 Cal. 3d 892, 91
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1970), the court extended the
holding in People v. Bauer, 1 Cal. 3d 368, 374, 461
P. 2d 637, 640, 82 Cal. Rptr. 357, 360 (1969), that
waiver of rights after receiving the Miranda
warning was intelligent although the defendant
was under the influence of narcotics. The waiver in
Bauer occurred contemporaneously with the arrest
and prior to the search. The factual pattern differs
in Houlk, where first the defendant's apartment was
searched, contraband found and then the defendant
was arrested upon returning to the apartment. The
Miranda warnings were finally given at police
headquarters.10 Houle was under the influence of
amphetamines, and because of that fact, the court
felt Bauer disposed of all Miranda problems. This
overlooks the potential impact of the discovery of
contraband on his mental state. In addition it
ignores the significance of the time-lag between
arrest and warning.n
8 12 Cal.3d 1102, 1106, 91 Cal. Rptr. 867, 870
(1970). These are the threshold circumstances requir-
ing the Miranda warning, i.e. warning must accom-
pany loss of freedom. 384 U.S. at 445 and 467.
912 Cal.3d 1102, 1109, 91 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872
(1970).
10 A bail bondsman legitimately arrested Houle "for
bail jumping" at his apartment and in the process
found amphetamines and a hypodermic needle. The
bondsman's search would have been illegal if conducted
by a police officer, but was permissible because of his
character as a private citizen. Thus the evidence was
admissible. 13 CaL3d 892, 896, 91 Cal. Rptr. 874,
876 (1970).
n See supra note 8.
INIGENT IMPRIsoNMENT
Tate v. Short, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 668 (1971),
held that imprisonment for inability to pay a fine
because of indigency is unconstitutional. This
extended the holding of Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235 (1970), that invidious discrimination
occurs if the total time of an indigent's imprison-
ment exceeds the maximum statutory limit be-
cause of the "work off" of a fine imposed in addi-
tion to imprisonment. 2 The constitutional basis
for each decision was the Equal Protection Clause.
"Since Texas has legislated a 'fines only' policy for
traffic offenses, that statutory ceiling cannot,
consistently with the Equal Protection Clause,
limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one
is able to pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison
term for an indigent defendant without the means
to pay his fine." 1 The supposed justification for
such imprisonment is not penal but fiscal, i.e.
augmenting state revenue. The Supreme Court
found no such purpose could possibly be served,
for the fine is never paid (because of defendant's
indigency) and the state additionally bears the cost
of imprisonment. In effect, there is discrimination
without rational basis. The Court referred to
Williams to re-assert the existence of alternatives
available to the state so that its valid interest in
enforcing fines could be secured. 4 The decision left
unresolved the constitutionality of imprisonment
when the alternatives fail and the defendant has
made reasonable efforts to pay the fines. Justice
Blackmun's concurrence suggested a possible
favorable result arising from Tate: elimination of
the fine altogether as alternative punishment for
traffic offenses and sole reliance on imprisonment to
reduce "the frightful carnage" of highway acci-
dents.1"
PnxsoNn RIcaTs
In Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68 (W.D.
Wis. 1971), the defendants claimed that 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 permitted them to sue the state and
compel prison officials to return them to a juvenile
detention center from an adult prison. The de-
fendants also asserted that the right to waive the
2 See 62 J. Can. L. C. & P. S. 56 (1971), for a brief
discussion of the Williams decision.
13 U.S. at_-, 91 S.Ct. at 671.
14 The Court mentioned two (installment payment
of fines and a parole requirement specifying certain
work during the day to satisfy the fine) and suggested
there were other possibilities. Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235, n. 24 at 244-45 (1970).
15 U.S. at , 91 S.Ct at 672.
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requirement of exhaustion of state remedies, a
procedural advantage of a section 1983 suit, is also
applicable to prisoner actions. The court held for
the petitioners and remanded the case for a trial
on the merits, ruling that the case was distinguish-
able from a federal habeas corpus suit. The court
explained that prisoners using section 1983 to
redress injustices concerning their confinement
rather than injustices incurred at trial were
bringing "extraordinary prisoner suits," not
habeas corpus actions. Since the nature of the
issues involved distinguishes the suits, the court
stated that a section 1983 suit was not a disguised
habeas corpus suit for purposes of avoiding state
administrative and judicial review.
After creating a separate category for section
1983 prisoner suits, the court addressed what it
felt was the real problem in the case, i.e. could
state administrative remedies be waived? Earlier
cases such as Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968), referred to the Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961) line of cases holding that state ad-
ministrative exhaustion was unnecessary. In
Houghton prison officials confiscated legal materials
being used by the petitioner to file an appeal. The
petitioner brought a section 1983 action and was
relieved of the necessity to appeal through the
state correctional system before getting into court.
Talbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970),
permitted a petitioner to bring a section 1983
action to recover damages for injuries sustained by
the refusal of prison authorities to give him insulin
for his diabetic condition. Following the lead
established by Houghton and Talbert, the court in
Edwards held that state administrative remedies
need not be exhausted. Thus, the Edwards decision
recognized "extraordinary prisoner suits as sep-
arate actions, procedurally and substantively, from
habeas corpus suits. This gives prison inmates an
alternative in attempting to redress "unconstitu-
tional" conditions of their confinement free of the
delay in exhausting state remedies.
CONTEPT AND THE UNlEIILy DEFENDANT
In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.
Ct. 499 (1971), the United States Supreme Court
held that where a judge has been insulted by a
defendant and then waits until the end of the trial
before sentencing the defendant for contempt of
court, a separate judge must try the contempt
charge. In Mayberry the trial judge was insulted
continually by the defendant. At one point in the
trial the judge placed the defendant in another
room with a loudspeaker because of the defendant's
refusal to be silent. Finding that the defendant
had been contumacious in behavior during eleven
of twenty-three days of trial, the judge sentenced
the defendant to more than one year but less than
two years for each day of contempt. Therefore,
the final contempt sentence was no less than eleven
nor more than twenty-two years. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and found that the lower
court properly excluded the defendant, but that
"evenhanded justice" would favor another judge
trying the defendant on the issue of contempt. The
Fourteenth Amendment concept of due process
guarantees. that the defendant will not be prej-
udiced by any retributive motives of the trial
judge. Surmising that the possibility for retribu-
tion existed where the judge awaited the end of the
trial to sentence the defendant for contempt, the
Court held in such situations that another judge
should sentence the defendant. Chief Justice
Burger added a caveat that summary removal was
the best procedure with a disruptive defendant.
Guidelines for requiring a judge other than the trial
judge to hear a trial on contempt were absent from
the opinion. Other than the factual inferences in
Mayberry, no standards exist for deciding when the
alternate judge is necessary.
MISDEMEANOR AND VENUE
In Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 91 S. Ct.
490 (1971), the Supreme Court held that where a
state undertakes to grant a jury trial for mis-
demeanor offenses, it must also assure the de-
fendant's right to an impartial jury. This, the
Court concluded, includes the right to a change of
venue, which was barred by Wisconsin statute."6
The Court, however, appeared to view a change of
venue as a last resort for securing impartiality
since it would first be appropriate for a defendant
to exhaust his opportunity to receive continuances
and to exercise his peremptory and cause challenges
for exclusion of jurors. 17 The majority refused to
decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment re,
quired a jury trial for misdemeanors. The con-
16 The Wisconsin Supreme Court construed a venue
statute for felony offenses to bar change of venue for
misdemeanors. The propriety of this construction
seemed to trouble both the majority and concurringjustices. 400 U.S. 505, 511, 91 S.Ct. 490,495 (1971).
17The majority did not discuss the adequacy of a
motion for a new trial because of jury partiality. Justice
Black in dissent thought the existence of this further
alternative prevented constitutional infirmity, and he
pointed out that the Wisconsin Supreme Court rested
its decision on this basis. Id. at 496.
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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
curring Justices (Burger and Blackmun) thought
no constitutional distinction between felony and
misdemeanor should exist for determning the
defendant's right to a fair trial."8
EIxcmorc SURvELLAxcE
In the first judicial tests of the wiretapping
provision of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. section 2511(3),19
two district courts have held that warrantless
electronic eavesdropping of domestic dissident
,s Id. at 494.19 This section reads:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in seqtion 605
of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 STAT.
1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as
he deems necessary to protect the Nation against
actual or potential attack nor other hostile acts of a
foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence infor-
mation deemed essential to the security of the
United States, or to protect national security in-
formation against foreign intelligence activities.
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be
deemed to limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems neces-
sary to protect the United States against the over-
throw of the Government by force or other unlawful
means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Govern-
ment. The contents of any wire or oral communi-
cation intercepted by authority of the President
in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding only where such interception was
reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or dis-
closed except as is necessary to implement that
power.
groups is unconstitutional. The court in United
States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Calif.
1971), held that even though the President is given
broad discretion to initiate warrantless taps of
phonelines, he is nonetheless bound by the ex-
clusionary rule derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment. The court expressly reserved any opinion as
to the President's power to issue wiretap orders
against foreign subversive groups. In United States
v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971),
a district court in Michigan similarly concluded
that the Fourth Amendment requires that war-
rants precede electronic surveillance of domestic
dissidents. The court also held that the defendant is
entitled to the log of all illegal wiretaps. This ruling
coincides with Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969), in which the Supreme Court, in a case
prior to the Ominibus Crime Control Act, ruled
that evidence. uncovered in unconstitutional
wiretapping must be revealed to the defendants in
pre-trial discovery.
Therefore, in two separate district court cases,
the wiretapping provision in section 2511(3) has
been applied to domestic groups in accordance
with previous case law. Any wiretapping of
domestic political radicals must be authorized by a
warrant obtained in accord with the Fourth
Amendment. Second, the log of all illegal wiretaps
must be made available to the defendant. Hence,
the wiretapping provision of the 1968 Act, over
government objection, has been narrowly inter-
preted.
Editor's Note
After the Reaent Trends Section went to press, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Affirmed the
Sinclair decision in United States v. U.S. District Court, 39 U.S.L.W. 2574 (6th Cir. April 20, 1971).
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